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I. INTRODUCTION
Over many years, beginning with the legal realism movement and
later with public choice theory and the critical legal studies movement,
there has been a growing awareness of the political significance of law
and of it being the result of political mechanisms. Expressions such as
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"the politics of law"' and "law and politics"2 are among the most com-
mon and useful terms in contemporary legal scholarship. This does not
abolish the distinction between legal rules and other cultural, social and
ethical norms and customs. Indeed, there are situations in which this
distinction is quite vague, but principally it exists. Law and politics,
although related concepts, are not identical.
Applying comparative law, this article portrays one aspect of the
nexus between law and politics, namely, the phenomenon of politics-as-
law (or, in other words, the legalization of politics) and the link between
this phenomenon and the politics of law. These phenomena and their
linkage will be illustrated by focusing on one of the most prominent
meeting points between law and politics: the process of investigation,
occasionally followed by indictments, of politicians holding senior posi-
tions in the executive branch (the branch which is itself entrusted with
investigations and indictments).
The politics-as-law phenomenon occurs when political questions
are decided by legal institutions, by legal rituals, or according to legal
rules. Critical legal approaches that diffuse traditional lines of separa-
tion contribute to this phenomenon. This tendency reflects postmodern
orientation where borders merge and distinct disciplines trespass into
each others' fields.
The politics-as-law phenomenon occurs in many democracies
around the world, but its expression differs from country to country.
This article suggests two basic prototypes of politics-as-law. One proto-
type is governmental-institutions oriented. In this variation, which is
common in the United States, the legislative and executive branches of
the government make final decisions in questions of law or make polit-
ical decisions via legal ritual ("politics-as-trial"). The second prototype
of politics-as-law is judicial-institutions oriented. Under this variation,
which is common in Israel, courts and judges make final decisions in
matters of politics and public policy.
Both prototypes of politics-as-law reflect social trends, yet only a
fraction of final legal decisions in the United States is actually taken by
the legislative and executive branches. Similarly, there are relatively
few significant national policy decisions in Israel that are made by the
courts. However, legalization of politics may reflect, and sometimes
constitute, social images that influence the substance of both legal and
political decisions.
1. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY (1984).
2. See, e.g., JACOB HERBERT, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1995);
RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (1985).
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In the United States, a clear manifestation of politics-as-law is the
impeachment procedure that recently took place against President Wil-
liam Clinton. A political move (in the traditional sense) veiled with the
cloak of a criminal trial, politicians from both sides of the spectrum did
not even try to conceal the true political nature of the impeachment
process.
An entirely different variation of politics-as-law is found in Israel.
Political questions in Israel often are resolved by judges. For instance,
the Israeli Supreme Court once fired a Government minister.3 On
another occasion, a commission headed by the Chief Justice ordered the
transfer of the Defense Minister from his office because of his negligent
performance while in office.4 Another commission headed by a Supreme
Court Justice presented detailed recommendations regarding reform in
the public health system.5
It would appear that the differences between expressions of poli-
tics-as-law in the United States and Israel are connected to significant
differences between the countries' common views regarding the rela-
tionship between law and politics.6 In Israel, the majority of the general
public, jurists, politicians, and center-line academics acknowledge the
fact that the legal establishment, comprised of judges and Civil Service
jurists, is professional and apolitical (or at least non-partisan). The deci-
sions made by this establishment enjoy a wide measure of confidence
from most of the public, short of religious Jews and the ultra-Orthodox
community in particular. The legal establishment is perceived as objec-
tive, substantive, and as disregarding personal or party considerations.7
This image is the antithesis of the image of the political authorities and
many politicians, who are suspected of routinely weighing improper or
irrelevant considerations.
Over the years, there has been a growing phenomenon in Israel of
transferring issues that are naturally regulated by the political branches
of the state (the legislative and the executive) to the legal establishment
3. The Court ordered Minister of the Interior Arieh Deri's removal from office, due to the
indictment pending against him on charges of corruption. See H.C. 3094/93, The Movement for
Quality of Governance in Israel v. The Government of Israel, 47(5) P.D. 404.
4. The Commission of Inquiry in regards to the Sabra and Shatilla Affair, Headed by Chief
Justice Itzhak Cahan, held that Ariel Sharon, then Minister of Defense, did not take all the
necessary precautions to prevent the massacre of Palestinian refugees by Lebanese residents, in
territory under Israel military rule at the time. See also infra note 143.
5. This Commission of Inquiry, headed by Supreme Court Justice Shoshana Netanyahu,
dealt with the organizational, administrative, fiscal and social aspects of the Israeli health system.
6. See generally Colin S. Diver, Israeli Administrative Law from an American Perspective, 4
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (HAIFA U. L. & GVT. REV.) I (1997).
7. See GAD BARZILAI, EPHRAYIM YUCHTMAN-YAAR & ZEEV SEGAL, THE ISRAELI SUPREME
COURT AND THE ISRAELI PUBLIC 127-131 (1994) (Hebrew).
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for handling and determination. At times, this phenomenon is deliber-
ately encouraged. Other times it is passively supported by those con-
nected with it: the legal establishment, the political authorities (both the
ruling coalition and the opposition), and the general public.
A number of tools have been used to transfer issues to the Israeli
judicial branch. Occasionally, use is made of traditional legal methods,
such as the prosecution service and criminal courts. In other cases,
changes have been made to existing procedures, such as a significant
expansion of locus standi and justiciability in political matters. Other
changes include the broadening of the jurisdiction of the State Comptrol-
ler to embrace matters that are politically controversial, while giving
great, and occasionally even decisive, weight to this official's conclu-
sions and recommendations. New tools also have developed, such as
commissions of inquiry chaired by judges who conduct judicial hearings
and possess the power to impose sanctions on political figures who have
not fulfilled their duties properly. These commissions can even recom-
mend policy changes.
At the same time, the substantive legal handling of political matters
has remained fairly restrained. In other words, the Israeli legal system
deals with political matters, but contrary to its image, it often does not
grant concrete relief or amend or annul decisions that fall within the
political arena.
The situation is different in the United States. The ethos of the
American legal system is not apolitical. Some of the persons who form
the legal establishment in the United States (judges and prosecutors) are
elected by the public in a process that is similar to the election process
for the legislative and executive authorities. Many others are appointed
by politicians, openly taking into account the appointees' political view-
points. A few, such as the Attorney-General, are political persona.9
Nevertheless, the American Courts gradually have developed
threshold doctrines that are fairly strict in relation to locus standi and
political questions. These doctrines enable the Courts to refrain from
hearing cases that are being contested between political authorities and
politicians. Approaches exist that negate the judiciary's "monopoly"
8. The State Comptroller in Israel is recognized as an autonomous branch of the State,
distinct from the classic branches of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. See H.C.
2581/91, Salahat v. Government of Israel, 47(4) P.D. 837, 843; H.C. 4914/94, Terner v. State
Comptroller, 49(3) P.D. 771. The State Comptroller possesses a special status in the eyes of the
Israeli public, which has no comparison in other countries. See AMNON RuBINSTEiN, THE
CONsTrrUTiONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 681 (5th ed. 1996) (R.19.1.4, 19.2).
9. For the difficulties arising out of this, see, e.g., Tom Rickhoff, The U.S. Attorney: Fateful
Powers Limited, 28 ST. MARY. L.J. 499, 504-08 (1997).
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over the interpretation of the Constitution and construction of statutes,10
these approaches contribute to the judiciary's ability to restrict its func-
tions in relation to politically controversial matters.
At the same time, the political elements in the United States have
not left a vacuum in areas where the legal establishment wishes to limit
its intervention. Thus, for example, investigations conducted by Con-
gress play an important role in personal matters (within the framework
of confirmation proceedings of the Presidential candidates for Secretar-
ies of State, Supreme Court Justices and the like) and in matters that
attract public attention in the United States.
The Israeli "Bar-On Affair,"'" in addition to its historical impor-
tance, is recognized as a highly significant milestone in the relations
between law and politics in Israel. The affair exposed the limitations
and weaknesses of the politics-as-law phenomenon as it had developed
in Israel and the opportunities offered to politicians to exploit the phe-
nomenon for their own benefit. It illustrated the disadvantages of the
legal establishment's application of traditional legal tools to handle
problems which by their nature fall within the political sphere, although
it is doubtful whether there is, or should be, an alternative in the current
governmental, political and social system which prevails in Israel. The
affair also exposed the politics of law, or the declared and hidden policy
considerations that affect the legal establishment upon dealing with defi-
nite political matters.1 2
As is well known, American case law and academia tend not to
seek to learn from other countries' experiences. This is particularly true
10. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What The Law Is, 83 GEO. L. REv. 217 (1994); Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in
Constitutional Law, 81 MiNN. L. REV. 1 (1996); Louis FISHER, CONSTTurIONAL CONFLIcrS
BETWEEN CONGRESs AND THE PRESIDENT 5 (4th ed. 1997). For a criticism of this approach see
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extra-judicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv.
L. REv. 1359 (1997).
11. This term, which originated in the press, also was adopted by the Supreme Court. The
official publication of the judgments given during the affair, issued by the Supreme Court and
carrying the symbol of the State of Israel, states on its binding: "Judgments in the Bar-On Affair."
The words "Bar-On Affair" were even used without quotation marks. This title was used even
though Bar-On was not a party to any of the proceedings, as no recommendation was made to
indict him and no petition was filed in respect of that decision. The Supreme Court, in response to
an application of the Israel Bar, clarified in a formal decision that the title was used only for
reference.
12. This issue is much more limited and focused than the general issue (which is the subject
of voluminous literature on jurisprudence and constitutional law) of the political functions of the
courts, and their nexus in that connection to the other authorities. In this article I refer to the
general issue only indirectly. It is also different from another issue that has attracted great interest,
namely, the "internal politics" of the court system.
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in the fields of constitutional law and judicial review. 13 The constitu-
tional law of other countries is perceived by American jurists as largely
irrelevant. 14 Indeed, engaging in comparative law, and even more so
comparative constitutional law, requires particular caution. 5 Certainly,
one country should not hurry to copy constitutional rules from another,
yet comparison is the basis for understanding.16 Through study of other
cultures, a country can learn something important about itself.' 7 Consid-
eration of a foreign legal system may, on occasion, actually demon-
strates that certain rules applicable in that system would not be
appropriate for adoption by another system, that has a different political
and social background.' 8
In this article I do not propose that any of the systems under discus-
sion is an appropriate model which is compatible for other countries.
The purpose of the discussion is to present how the points of similarity
between both political and social cultures in Israel and the United States
contribute to the politics-as-law phenomenon. At the same time, this
article shows that the points of cultural disparity contribute to a diver-
gence of paths through which this phenomenon is expressed.
In this article, I shall present the main elements of the Bar-On
Affair. I shall show how the affair and a line of legal decisions that have
arisen as a consequence of the affair, illustrate different aspects of poli-
tics-as-law in Israel. This article will try to expose the nexus between
the affair and the politics of law. This will be done by comparing analo-
gous issues in American law, particularly the Watergate and Clinton-
Lewinsky affairs. Finally, from a more general perspective, I shall
describe the politics-as-law phenomenon in Israel in comparison with
the United States. I will explain and present the advantages and disad-
vantages it presents in each country, and I will consider how the politics
of law expresses, and even how it should express, the balance between
such advantages and disadvantages.
In Part II, I shall consider the role of the Attorney-General and
statutes dealing with the investigation and indictment of senior public
officials, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, and a
13. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772-74
(1997).
14. See Scott H. Bice & Larry G. Simon, Introduction, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 401-03 (1980).
15. See Pnina Lahav, The Art of Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 697
(1980).
16. See Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of
Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 409, 412 (1980) (quoting Novalis).
17. See Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 966.
18. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under a Siege: Is
Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1994).
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member of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament, who were at the center
of the Bar-On Affair). In Part III, I will review the background, facts,
and proceedings of the Bar-On Affair. Part IV discusses the decision of
the court not to indict the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice for
their roles in the Affair and the judicial review of these decisions. In
Part V, I will consider the decision not to remove the Minister of Justice
from office and the judicial review involved in that decision. Part VI
explores the decision not to set up a legal commission of inquiry to
investigate the Bar-On Affair and the judicial review of that decision as
well. Notwithstanding that the leading narrative in these sections will
concern the Israeli Bar-On Affair, the sections also include analogous
American narratives and general legal paradigms regarding the two
countries.
In Part VII, I will consider the phenomenon of politics-as-law in
Israel by drawing a comparison with the United States. Part VIII will
deal with the nexus between politics-as-law and the politics of law.
II. THE ATrORNEY-GENERAL AND THE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The appointment of the Attorney-General is extremely important in
Israel. The position is a senior office in the executive branch and, in
contrast to the United States, is separate and distinct from the political
position of Minister of Justice.19
The Israeli Attorney-General fulfills at least four central func-
tions.20 First, the Attorney-General is the chief legal adviser to the State
Authorities. Her opinion on legal matters binds the Government.2" It
19. For the Attorney-General in the United States, see LUTHER A. HUSTON, ARTHUR SELWYN
MILLER, SAMUEL KRISLOV, & ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES (1968); CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLmCS OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY-
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (1992). Cf. STATE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Lynne
M. Ross ed. 1990).
20. Professor Ruth Gavison also has pointed to the function of preserving the interests of the
public. See Ruth Gavison, The Attorney-General: A Critical Examination of New Trends, 5
PLILIM (IsR. J. CRIM. Jus.) 27, 34, 45-47 (1996). In my opinion, this function does not stand on its
own, but is usually integrated within the three general functions. For a division of the functions of
the Attorney-General into two categories only, advice and representation, see Abraham Weinrot,
Duality in the Attorney-General's Roles, 2 HAMISHPAT 85 (1996).
21. See H.C. 3094/93, Movement for Quality of Governance in Israel v. Government of
Israel, 47(5) P.D. 404, 425; H.C. 4267/93, Amiti v. Citizens for Proper Administration and Purity
of Standards v. The Prime Minister, 47(5) P.D. 441, 473; H.C. 320/96, German v. Council of the
City of Hertzlia (not yet published); H.C. 4247/98, Meretz Faction v. Minister of Religious Affairs
(not yet published); Itzhak Zamir, The Attorney-General and the Struggle for the Legality of
Government, 11 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 411 (1987) (Hebrew). However, there are those who
disagree with these judgments. See Gavison, supra note 20, at 85-96. See also REPORT OF THE
PUBLIC COMMISSION INTO THE MANNER OF APPOINTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND
MATTERS CONNECTED WITH HIS OFFICE (1998) (hereinafter, The Shamgar Report). The
2000]
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may be said that the Attorney-General is the primary organ of the Gov-
ernment authorities in matters of law. In other words, the Government is
forbidden to perform an act that the Attorney-General declares unlawful.
It is customary to state that in this job, the Attorney-General's first duty
is to the law and public interest, and subject only to these does she
advise the Government.22 Secondly, the Attorney-General is entrusted
with the preparation and formulation of bills on behalf of the Govern-
ment and the examination of private bills submitted by Knesset mem-
bers.23 Third, the Attorney-General heads the criminal prosecution
service. She, as well as those subordinate to her, have the power to
order the police to conduct (or not to conduct) a criminal investigation.
Fourth, the Attorney-General, and those subordinate to her, are the
exclusive representatives of all of the State branches in the Courts.2 4
This "monopoly" is an instrument of the Attorney-General that enables
her to force the Government to abide by her legal views. Accordingly, if
the Government fails to obey the Attorney-General on a particular mat-
ter, she may ask the Court, on behalf of the Government, to uphold a
petition filed against it in that matter.2 5
In the United States, the Solicitor-General fulfills functions parallel
to those of the Israeli Attorney-General in terms of her powers of repre-
sentation. There is an ongoing debate whether the Solicitor-General
should be an ordinary lawyer, who, subject to basic standards of profes-
sional ethics, owes a duty of trust to her client, or whether she may only
make legal representations in accordance with what, in her opinion, the
law provides. Today, the balance is tilting towards the first approach,
namely, that the Solicitor-General makes representations in accordance
with the instructions of the administration in so far as she receives
them.26
Commission was appointed by the Minister of Justice following the Bar-On Affair. Chairing the
Commission was Meir Shamgar, a former Chief Justice and Attorney-General. Three former
Ministers of Justice and Professor Ruth Gavison joined him on the panel. The Commission had
reservations in portraying the Attorney-General's opinion as binding the government in every
case, and was of the opinion that in exceptional cases the government should be enabled to argue
against the opinion in Court. See Gavison, supra note 20, at 71-75.
22. See, e.g., Itzhak Zamir, The Attorney-General: A Public Servant, Not a Government
Servant, in CLINGHOFER BOOK ON PUBLIC LAW 451 (Itzhak Zamir ed., 1993); Ariel Bendor &
Zeev Segal, The Attorney-General - The Law and the Government, HAPRAKLIT (forthcoming
1999) R. 17.2 (Hebrew).
23. See the Knesset's Regulations, § 118(b); The Shamgar Report, supra note 21, at 12, 20.
24. See The Civil Procedure Amendment (The State as a Litigant) Act, § 4 (1958).
25. See The Shamgar Report, supra note 21, at 12, 22.
26. See, e.g., Todd Lochner, The Relationship Between The Office of Solicitor-General and
the Independent Agencies: A Revolution, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 566-567 (1993); REBECCA M.
SSLOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 77 (1992). But cf. Kathryn Mickle
Werdeger, The Solicitor-General and Administrative Due Process: A Quarter Century of
Advocacy, 36 G.W. L. REV. 481 (1968); John 0. Mcginnis, Principle Versus Politics: The
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In any event, both countries' executives are entitled to dismiss the
Attorney-General (in Israel) or the Solicitor-General (in the United
States), if they are unwilling to represent them as desired. In Israel, for
example, Attorney-General Itzhak Zamir was hastily replaced in 1986
because of the Government's unwillingness to be represented by him in
various proceedings concerning the exposure of offenses in the General
Security Services.27 In the United States, similar incidents took place
regarding the representation of the Administration in the Watergate
Affair and in relation to a variety of issues during the Reagan
Administration.28
It seems that in Israel the Attorney-General is less dependent on the
elected Government and, overall, more autonomous than her American
counterpart. In contrast to the American Solicitor-General, whose
cadence is linked to that of the elected President, in Israel there is no
custom of replacing the Attorney-General with every new Government
formation.
It also should be noted that the functions that are fulfilled by the
Israeli Attorney-General are carried out in the United States by two per-
sons: the Attorney-General, who holds a position equivalent to that of a
Secretary of State, and the Solicitor-General. Both are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.29 On a federal level, even these
functions are more narrowly defined than in Israel.
In view of the importance of the position in Israel, a custom has
developed whereby the appointee to Attorney-General is a person whose
qualifications are equivalent to those of a Supreme Court Justice.3 °
These qualifications are expressed in terms of professional skills and
experience, as well as nonpartisanship. Past critiques have held that
only lawyers whom the government could assume would act in its favor
were appointed to the post. However, those assumptions often were
unfounded. In recent decades, the office has been filled by senior jurists
not affiliated with any political party or with a defined political view.
An important American effort to contend with difficulties imposed
by investigations and indictments of senior public officials was the
Solicitor-General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799
(1992).
27. For this affair, see MosHE NEGBI, ABOVE THE LAW THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN
ISRAEL (1987) (Hebrew); YEHIEL GUTMAN, A STORM IN THE G.S.S. - THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT (1995) (Hebrew).
28. For a description of this and other affairs, see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE
SOLICITOR-GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987). See also Leland Ware, Book Review, 33 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1129 (1989).
29. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
30. See Cabinet's announcement of September 5, 1960.
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Office of Independent Counsel,3' which was known originally as the
Special Prosecutor.3" This office was anchored in the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978,33 which was enacted after the Watergate Affair.34
The statute, the constitutionality of which was confirmed by the
Supreme Court, 35 was renewed and amended on a number of occa-
sions. 36 The Act expired on June 1999, after Congress chose not to
renew it.
The Ethics in Government Act was required because the heads of
the investigation and prosecution service are political figures who are
adherents of the President and whose positions in office depend upon
him. The purpose of the law was to assure that high-level officials
would be investigated by people who were not influenced by their hier-
archical superiors.37 This was necessary to preserve the rule of law and
to make the President himself, together with other senior government
officials, subject to the law. It also was designed to ensure the confi-
dence of the public in the enforcement of the law in an equal and fair
manner. The Ethics in Government Act aimed to accomplish these goals
by providing for investigations and prosecutions of senior government
officials which were to be conducted by independent prosecutors. These
special prosecutors were to be appointed by a bench of three judges,
which acted as the sole supervisor of their activities. The Attorney-Gen-
eral was granted authority to decide the appointment of Independent
Counsel. 31 Congress could request that the Attorney-General exercise
her powers, and it was also empowered to impeach Independent
31. See generally KATY JEAN HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1992); Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From
Watergate to Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011-2389 (1998); Symposium, Special
Prosecutions and the Role of the Independent Counsel 16 HOF. L. REV. 1-130 (1987); JOHN. E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267-72 (5th ed. 1995); Louis FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 73-75, 185-86 (4th ed.
1997).
32. The title of the lawyer appointed under the act was changed from Special Prosecutor to
Independent Counsel in order to avoid any connotation that the appointment meant that a criminal
violation had occurred and that prosecution would ensue. See Samuel Dash, Independent
Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor, 86 GEO. L.J. 2077, 2079 (1998).
33. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591, et seq.
34. The Watergate Affair is a general term, used to describe a complex web of political
scandals between 1972 and 1974. The burglary and subsequent cover-up led to moves to impeach
President Richard Nixon. Nixon resigned from the presidency on the 8th of August 1974.
35. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). For the briefs which were submitted to the
D.C. Circuit in this case, see The Constitutional Validity of the Ethics in Government Act:
Morrison v. Olson, 16 HOF. L. REV. 65 (1987).
36. See Jerome J. Shestack, Forward: The Independent Counsel Act Revisited, 86 GEO. L.J.
2011, 2013 (1998).
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Counsel.39
The extent to which the institution of independent counsel in the
United States has succeeded in achieving its aims remains disputed.
There are those who believe that the damage it has caused outweighs its
benefits.4" It is argued, inter alia, that the Ethics in Government Act
compels criminal investigations of senior officials in relation to political
power disputes between the executive and the legislative branches. 4"
The Attorney-General was put under serious political pressure to recom-
mend appointments of Independent Counsel.4" With the encouragement
of the media, and in view of their desire to justify their actions and high
costs in terms of time and money, independent counsel tended to over-
file indictments.43 These are some of the reasons that the role of
independent counsel was terminated recently. 44
The impression is that at the root of the problem of the independent
counsel was the fact that the office was not shaped successfully, and in
effect had not tried to detach the investigation and prosecution of senior
officials from the political system. The institution was shaped, in
accordance with the tradition of American government, by the attempt to
create checks and balances between the legislative and executive
branches. These branches never were attempted to be neutralized. As
noted, the Attorney-General and Congress were involved in the process
of appointing independent counsels. Many of the independent counsels
(Kenneth Starr is certainly a prominent example) were distinct political
figures. Often, not only would a political connection not prevent the
appointment of a person to the post of independent prosecutor, it would
help the individual obtain that appointment.45 Further, the American
system whereby state judges are elected implies that the three-judge
panel that confirmed the appointment and supervised the activities of the
independent counsel was also not entirely dissociated from the political
arena.
Against this background it is not surprising that in order to contend
39. See id.
40. See id.; Joseph E. di Genova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End a Bad
Idea, 86 GEO. L.J. 2299 (1998); Norman J. Onrnstein, Doing Congress's Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L.J.
2179 (1998); Shestack, supra note 36.
41. See di Genova, supra note 40, at 2303; Orenstein, supra note 40, at 2188-89; Sunstein,
supra note 37, at 2276-77.
42. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 697 (1988) (J. Scalia, dissenting).
43. See Philip B. Heymann, Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an
Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2230 (1998); di Genova, supra note 40, at 2304.
44. See NEW YORK TimEs, June 28, 1999, June 30, 1999.
45. See Laurence E. Welsh, The Need for Renewal of the Independent Counsel Act, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2379, 2383 (1998); see Michael R. Bromwick, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector
General Model, 86 GEO L.J. 2027, 2230 (1998); di Genova, supra note 40, at 2304.
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with the difficulties in the activities of independent counsel, it has been
suggested that the political balances underlying their activities be
changed.46 Thus, for example, a proposal has been made to give the
President absolute discretion over whether to appoint independent coun-
sel, thereby eliminating the judiciary's role and placing responsibility
with the politically-accountable executive.47
Indeed, it is doubtful whether in the political tradition of the United
States it is possible, or even desirable, to confer investigative and
prosecutorial powers on completely apolitical bodies. Such bodies, even
if they could be established, might be seen as weak and ineffective.
Moreover, in so far as the investigations may lead to impeachment pro-
ceedings (which are a clear example of politics-as-law in its American
manifestation), the political nature of these proceedings are consistent
with the political characteristics of the investigative processes leading to
them.
The main problem with the structure of the Ethics in Government
Act is that it encourages excessive investigations and prosecutions.48
This is undoubtedly less serious than would be the case if there were too
few prosecutions against senior public officials, a situation which poten-
tially has serious repercussions for the rule of law and public confidence
in government. In any event, the problem of a surplus of investigations
and prosecutions may be dealt with by changes in the allocation of
power between the various authorities involved in the appointment of
independent counsels and their supervision. This would eliminate the
need to eradicate the office as a whole.
As a result of Israel's Bar-On Affair, there may be room to adopt
the institution of Independent Counsel in Israeli law, despite the fact that
the United States model of the office was cancelled. This suggestion is
based upon the multiplicity of functions of the Israeli Attorney-General,
who acts as both legal advisor to the Government and as the head of the
prosecution in criminal trials. The fear that arises in light of routine
working relations between the Attorney-General and senior government
officials is that the Attorney-General may find it difficult to make unbi-
ased and objective decisions regarding the conduct of investigations or
filing of indictments against those officials.
In light of this problem, some scholars have proposed that the func-
tions of the Attorney-General be divided and responsibility for criminal
46. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133,
2136 (1998).
47. Id.
48. But see Dan W. Reicher, Note, Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice
Department, and Special Prosecutor Investigations of Agency Heads, 35 STA. L. REV. 975
(1983).
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prosecutions be entrusted to a person who does not act as legal advisor
to persons whom she may be required to one day indict.49 Following the
Bar-On Affair, a committee headed by former Chief Justice Meir Sham-
gar, in which three former Ministers of Justice and a professor of law
were members, was appointed to consider and formulate recommenda-
tions relating to the appointment and powers of the Attorney-General.
The committee rejected this proposal. 50 It was of the opinion that sever-
ance of the functions of the Attorney-General would weaken and impair
the effectiveness her office and of the criminal prosecution. 51 This was
so, inter alia, because the power of the Attorney-General to institute
criminal proceedings contributes to the willingness of government lead-
ers to comply with her legal instructions for fear of an indictment if they
fail to do so. In the opinion of the committee, the actual working rela-
tions between the Attorney-General and government officials did not
prevent the institution of criminal proceedings against the latter. 2 This
was particularly true in light of the willingness of the Supreme Court to
review the exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion not to indict.
However, some members did argue that the Bar-On Affair raised doubt
as to whether this was indeed the case.53
Appointing a special prosecutor to handle concrete cases in which a
suspicion exists that a criminal offense has been committed by senior
government officials would not substantively impair the status of the
Attorney-General. In view of the apolitical character of the Israeli legal
establishment, it is likely that such an arrangement would not encounter
the problems involved in its operation in the United States, namely the
tendency to over-prosecute generated by political and media pressure. It
may be assumed that, in Israel, professional jurists having no political
affiliation (appointed as special prosecutors by apolitical Courts at the
request of the Attorney-General or by the Attorney-General herself, who
is also not a political figure) will not routinely lean towards an increase
or decrease of prosecutions.
The proposal to adopt the institution of independent counsel in
Israel is an example of an unconventional use of comparative law. Pre-
cisely because of the governmental and cultural differences between
49. See GAD BARZILAI & DAVID NACHMIAS, THE ATrORNEY-GENERAL: AuTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY 45-47 (1997) (Hebrew). The authors recommend that the government will be
distanced from the appointment of the head of the criminal prosecution and that the appointment
be entrusted to a primarily professional committee.
50. See The Shamgar Report, supra note 21, at 52-56.
51. See The Shamgar Report, supra note 21, at 48, 53-56.
52. See The Shamgar Report, supra note 21, at 48, 55-56.
53. For a discussion of judicial review of decisions of the Israeli Attorney-General not to
indict government officials, see infra Part llI.C.
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Israel and the United States, an institution of American origin may
achieve greater success in Israel than it has achieved so far in the United
States.
III. THE BAR-ON AFFAIR: THE BACKGROUND, THE FACTS,
AND THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
A consideration of Israel's Bar-On Affair requires knowledge of its
basic facts. Naturally, it is not possible to set out the full details of the
affair in this article.54 It is essential however, to review the central fac-
tual and legal issues. The legal issues will be considered through a com-
parison with analogous laws of the United States.
On January 10, 1997, the Government of Israel decided to appoint
Roni Bar-On to the post of Attorney-General. The appointment of Bar-
On caused debate in the Government, and he was not unanimously
appointed. This was due to the fact that at the time of his appointment
Bar-On was an active member of the Prime Minister's political party
(the "Likud"). He also was not considered to be one of the senior law-
yers in Israel. Nevertheless, honoring the wishes of then Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu and his Minister of Justice Tzahi Hanegbi (in the
past a paralegal of Bar-On), Bar-On was appointed by majority vote.
However, less than three days later-in the aftermath of public out-
cry, and petitions to the Supreme Court against the appointment and
criticism of Bar-On's life style-Bar-On gave notice of his resignation.
A few weeks later, in a highly acclaimed move, the Government decided
to appoint Judge Elyakim Rubinstein to the office of Attorney-General.
The Minister of Justice gave notice of the establishment of a distin-
guished committee, which was headed by the former Chief Justice Meir
Shamgar, to make recommendations relating to the proper method of
appointment of the Attorney-General.55
It is likely that the affair would have ended at this point had it not
been for a news item broadcast by the Television Channel 1 News Divi-
sion. In the broadcast it was reported that the appointment of Bar-On
had been made by the instigation of Knesset Member Arieh Deri, then
standing trial on charges of corruption. According to the news item, an
understanding had been reached between Deri and Bar-On to the effect
that if Bar-On were appointed to the post of Attorney-General, he would
enter into a favorable plea bargain arrangement with Deri.56 This plea
54. For a detailed description and discussion of the Bar-On affair, see Zeev Segal, Shadows
Surrounding the Rule of Law - Along with the Bar-On Affair and its Outcome, 4 MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL (HAIFA U. L. & GovT. REV.) 587 (1998) (Hebrew).
55. See The Shamgar Report, supra note 21.
56. See HAARETz, Jan. 23, 1997.
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bargain would enable Deft, who prior to his trial had held the office of
Minister, to return to his former position in the Government, thereby
rescuing his political career. The journalist claimed that Deri insisted on
the appointment of Bar-On and threatened that the political party headed
by him ("Shas") would not support the Prime Minister in the important
pending vote regarding Israel's withdrawal from the city of Hebron.
The broadcast charged that criminal elements had succeeded in bringing
about the appointment of the head of the criminal prosecution service in
Israel, thereby taking control of it. The seriousness of these charges led
the acting Attorney General to order a police inquiry into the affair, a
decision supported by the Prime Minister.58
The police inquiry took approximately three months. It was con-
ducted by the Head of the Investigative Branch of the Israeli Police, and
it was closely supervised by the Attorney-General, the State-Attorney,
and their staff. During the inquiry, all those involved in the affair were
investigated, including the Prime Minister and various other ministers.
At the conclusion of the investigation, on April 15, 1997, the police
submitted all findings and recommendations to the Attorney-General.
The police recommended that charges be brought against four people:
Prime Minister Netanyahu, Minister of Justice Hanegbi, Knesset Mem-
ber Deri, and Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, Avigdor
Liberman.59
After the findings and recommendations of the police were
examined, the Attorney General and the State Attorney published a
detailed report on April 20, 1997, which included a decision of the
Attorney General and an opinion of the State Attorney which was
adopted by the Attorney General. The report gave notice of intention to
bring charges solely against Knesset Member Deri (subject to his right
to an oral hearing) and to close the files remaining against the other
persons involved in the affair, including the Prime Minister.60
Following are a number of brief excerpts from the report, the full
version of which is, very long and detailed:
Our legal approach was that offenses of a political-public nature
should be treated like every other offence, i.e., the fact that the per-
sons connected to the affair are from the public-political sector
should not work for their benefit nor to their detriment .... Our
57. See JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 26, 1997.
58. See HAARETZ, Jan. 26, 1997.
59. See id.
60. The Attorney-General requested that the investigation continue with respect to two
secondary persons involved - Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office Liberman and
businessman David Appel, who were suspected of acting as middle-men in the affair. Ultimately,
the investigation against both these persons was closed.
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dilemma was very difficult also because of the need in our decision to
examine the line distinguishing between culpability from a moral-
public-ethical point of view, and what is criminal. . . . There are
numerous sanctions against those committing offenses or who are
guilty of omissions in the political arena .... [The political sanctions]
do not negate, of course, the criminal aspect .... We did not regard
this case as a "borderline" case, where - subject to the evidence - it
is possible not to initiate criminal proceedings but to make do with
other sanctions .... Our approach in examining the body of evidence
was that if sufficient evidence existed, indictments would be filed -
in the light of the extreme importance of the matter, which exposes
the most unexplored elements of proper governance, and touches
upon the heart of the system of law enforcement.
Sadly, the evidence gives rise to the suspicion that people who
were subject to criminal proceedings united in order to decide who
would be the Attorney-General, out of personal interests, using con-
nections and political power, and even succeeded in this. At the same
time, the inquiry did not reveal the full picture connected with the
appointment of Bar-On. In this connection we should add that some
of those involved did not cooperate and the impression left is that
they did not tell everything known to them.
[In relation to Prime Minister Netanyahu:] The factual chronol-
ogy of events . . . prima facie gives rise to puzzlement. . . This
puzzlement leads to a suspicion that those considerations mentioned
by the Prime Minister [on which he based his decision to appoint
Bar-On] were not the exclusive considerations, and that there was an
additional motive to his desire to appoint Attorney Bar-On specifi-
cally. Indeed, there is a real suspicion that this motive was an illegiti-
mate motive, the desires of Knesset Member Deri who influenced
and pressurized the Prime Minister on this matter.... [However,] the
existing evidence is not sufficient to prove this suspicion adequately
in a criminal trial... although the doubts are looming, even if suffi-
cient evidence was not found to file an indictment.
[In relation to Minister of Justice Hanegbi:] Indeed, from the
beginning, he should have examined Deri's reasons for wanting the
appointment of Bar-On.... At the same time, in our opinion, against
the background of his real desire to appoint Bar-On and his not being
part of a wrongful conspiracy to appoint Bar-On to the position, his
failing was not in the nature of a criminal offence .... [With regard to
the conduct of the Minister of Justice during the Government meet-
ing:] In our opinion, there was no criminal offence, even if there was
a deviation from the norms of proper conduct. 6'
The very existence of an investigation conducted by the Head of
the Investigative Branch of the Police, with the close and personal
61. The Shamgar Report, supra note 21.
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involvement of the Attorney-General, coupled with the fact that the
Attorney-General personally made the decision whether charges would
be filed, demonstrates the complex relationship between politics-as-law
and the politics of law. The fact that the Attorney-General himself made
the decision not to prosecute gave rise to the impression that the Prime
Minister was not being treated in the same way as every other citizen.62
The difficulty increases in the context of the close working rela-
tions between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, and the Attor-
ney-General. It should also be noted that three of the attorneys assisting
the Attorney-General in handling the affair, recommended that charges
be brought against the Prime Minister, but their recommendations were
rejected. These attorneys were far-removed in their regular work from
the politicians standing at the head of the executive authority. In con-
trast, among the supporters of the decision of the Attorney-General were
attorneys who worked in the Petitions Section of the State-Attorney's
Office and who dealt with the representation of the State and its leaders
in petitions brought before courts. In practice, the position of the Prime
Minister was subjected to standards outside of the norm.
Despite this, it is difficult to see how the Attorney-General could
have refrained from intervening in the affair for numerous reasons.
First, such intervention is required by Basic Law: the Government, Sec-
tion 25(a), which provides that "no criminal investigation shall be
opened against the Prime Minister save with the consent of the Attor-
ney-General, and no indictment shall be filed against the Prime Minister,
save by the Attorney-General."63
Secondly, and more importantly, the decisions that had to be made
were grave decisions of historical significance. Attorney-General
Rubinstein himself mentioned this when he noted that ". . . in the history
of the State of Israel there is no case similar to the instant one in terms of
sensitivity, the rank of those involved and also the heavy suspicion that
casts its shadow on the investigation."' In such a case, and in the
absence of an office of independent counsel in Israel, it is the head of the
pyramid who bears overall responsibility in decision making. Accord-
ingly, it is inevitable that the regulation of politics by law will result in
the influence of politics on the law, or at least the semblance of such
influence.
Immediately following the conclusion of the press conference in
62. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Role of the Prosecutor, 5 PLILIM (IsR. J. CRIM. Jus.) 173,
186 (1996) (Hebrew).
63. S.H. 1992, at 214.
64. Decision Atty. Gen. No. 3164/97, The Investigation of the Affairs of Appointing Attorney
Roni Bar-On to the Office of the Attorney-General-Findings and Conclusions (Apr. 20, 1997).
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which the decision of the Attorney-General and the State-Attorney was
published, Prime Minister Netanyahu praised the fact that justice had
been upheld and vowed to ensure that the necessary lessons would be
learned from the affair.6 5  Simultaneously, the Prime Minister con-
demned the political motives of those who had stood behind the broad-
casts made against him.66 Minister of Justice Hanegbi also applauded
the result, which he regarded as a total vindication and a repudiation of
all the charges made against him, including the charge of misleading the
Government as to the stance of the Chief Justice in relation to the
appointment.67 Hanegbi stated that he intended to apply the lessons
learned from this affair. 6
8
As a consequence of these events, petitions were filed before the
Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. This is the central
court in Israel for constitutional and administrative matters. All of the
petitions were filed by public persons or bodies, most of which were
opposition Knesset members. An organization specializing in the sub-
mission of petitions on matters of public interest ("The Movement for
Quality of Governance in Israel") and a variety of citizens, the majority
of whom were lawyers also filed petitions.
In these petitions, the Court was asked to order a number of reme-
dies: (1) to order the Attorney-General to file indictments against Prime
Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Justice Hangebi for their participa-
tion in the affair; (2) to order that the Minister of Justice be removed
from his position as a minister in the Government, or at least that he be
transferred from the office of Minister of Justice to another ministerial
position; and, (3) to require the Government to set up a legal commis-
sion of inquiry, headed by a judge, to investigate the affair.69
65. See JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 21, 1997.
66. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated, "There is a big difference between making a mistake
and committing an offense. I made a mistake in the appointment [of Bar-On], but did not commit
a transgression. . . . Some media people identified with the left were happy to adopt every
malicious accusation, as imaginary as it may be or as groundless, as long as I was at its center."
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 21, 1997.
67. See HAARETZ, June 16, 1997.
68. See id.
69. The Court also was asked, as secondary relief, to order the State to give the petitioners all
investigative material gathered by the police during the course of the affair, the final report of the
police, and the dissenting opinions of a number of attorneys who were part of the investigative
team and who reached the conclusion that the evidentiary material was sufficient for an indictment
against the Prime Minister. This application was denied by majority decision, on the grounds that
the delivery of the material asked for would not assist the adjudication of the petitions, in light of
the detailed report of the Attorney-General and State-Attorney. See H.C. 2534/97, Yahav v. State-
Attorney, 51(3) P.D. 39. An additional petition filed against the decision to indict Knesset
Member Deri, contending that the decision was tainted by discrimination on ethnic grounds, was
withdrawn by the petitioner at the suggestion of the Court. In this article I shall not deal with the
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In a line of judgments, all of which were given on June 15, 1997,
the Supreme Court dismissed all the petitions. Some of the petitions
were dismissed unanimously, while others, including the petition to
indict the Prime Minister, were dismissed by a majority of four justices
to one.7°
It should be noted that the hearing in the High Court of Justice
takes place in two stages. In the first stage, the Court decides whether
there is a prima facie basis for the petition.7' If such a basis is found, a
decree nisi is issued requiring the respondents to make an affidavit in
reply. 72 The issue of a decree nisi in effect shifts the onus of proof, and
it is for the respondents to persuade the Court why it would be proper to
dismiss the petition.73
In the Bar-On case the petitions were dismissed in the first stage,
without the grant of a decree nisi. Thus, it may be inferred that even the
minority justices in the petitions dismissed by a majority did not express
a firm opinion that the petitions should be upheld, but they merely held
that, prima facie, the petitions were serious and could potentially be
upheld, and that there was room to issue a decree nisi.
Hereafter, I shall consider the grounds for the decisions in relation
to each of the issues that arose in these hearings.
IV. THE DECISION NOT TO INDICT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW THEREOF
A. The Prime Minister
Both in Israel and in the United States, the decision whether or not
to indict requires a determination in relation to three subsidiary consider-
ations: (1) whether the act which a person is alleged to have committed
is an offense; (2) whether there is a public interest in putting that person
on trial; and (3) whether there is sufficient evidence against the suspect
to warrant an indictment."
In Israel one does not encounter the American problem of whether
it is possible to criminally indict a sitting President who has not first
public reaction to the decision to indict Knesset Member Deri alone, a decision which was indeed
interpreted by part of the public as reflecting a discriminatory attitude.
70. As a rule, the Supreme Court of Israel, which is comprised of twelve justices, does not sit
with a full complement, but with benches of three justices, generally selected at random and
changing from case to case. Nevertheless, in important petitions, greater numbers of justices sit.
In view of the importance of the Bar-On Affair, five justices sat in judgment.
71. See Regulations of Procedure in the High Court of Justice, 1984, K.T. 1984 at 2321,
regulation 5.
72. See id. regulations 7, 8.
73. See id. regulations 7, 8, 16.
74. See 1951, S.H. 228.
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been impeached by the Senate. The Israeli Basic Law enables the
indictment of a sitting Prime Minister, provided that the charges are per-
sonally filed by the Attorney General and are heard by a bench of three
judges in the District Court of Jerusalem.76
The offense attributed to Prime Minister Netanyahu was a breach of
trust affecting the public. This offense is considered problematic
because its actus reus is not clearly defined in an objective manner.
This is contrary to what is generally required in criminal law. Therefore,
the Courts require that each of the three aforementioned considerations
be rigorously met.
With regard to Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Attorney-General
concluded that the first two requirements for instituting an indictment
had been satisfied. The Prime Minister was suspected of committing the
offense of breach of trust in one of two ways. Either Netanyahu had
promised Knesset Member Deri to appoint Bar-On to the position of
Attorney General with the knowledge that Deri had hoped for the
appointment to promote his own interests in the criminal proceedings
being conducted against him, or he had recommended the appointment
of Bar-On to the position knowing the improper connection between
Bar-On and Deri. Each of these alternatives amounted to a criminal
offense. They were not borderline behaviors from the point of view of
criminality. Similarly, there was a public interest in filing indictments in
relation to such acts.
Nevertheless, the Attorney General did not find sufficient evidence
to prove the suspicions against the Prime Minister, which would have
warranted issuing an indictment against him. In so finding, the Attorney
General was of the opinion that the evidentiary material in relation to the
Prime Minister should be examined in accordance with ordinary stan-
dards accepted in every criminal case. Effectively, he took a stance on
what was not an easy question. On the one hand, distinguishing between
the Prime Minister and ordinary citizens in such a way that evidence
which would be sufficient to indict the latter would not be regarded as
sufficient to indict the former could be interpreted by the public as a
serious violation of the principle of equality. This was true because it
appeared to favor those in governmental positions. On the other hand,
indicting the Prime Minister could have far-reaching repercussions.
There is a strong possibility that had a decision been made to indict him,
Prime Minister Netanyahu would have resigned or at least suspended
75. See JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 137-40 (1996); ERIc M. FREEDMAN,
The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before
Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7 (1992).
76. 1992, S.H. 214.
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himself for a significant period of time until the conclusion of his trial.
This, in turn would have altered the history of the State of Israel. Should
this consideration not be taken into account when determining the evi-
dentiary standard for filing an indictment? Shouldn't the Prime Minister
be subject to more exacting standards to ensure that he would only be
indicted when it was certain that the existing evidence would lead to his
conviction? Is this not the best way to prevent any possibility of an
unjustified displacement of a Prime Minister elected by the people?
Indeed, Justice Dalia Dorner, the minority judge in the petition to
order the Attorney General to indict the Prime Minister, in a restrained
formulation, commented that "from the reasons for the closure of the
investigative file against the Prime Minister, it appears that the Attorney
General erred in applying the test, and in fact the threshold according to
which the evidentiary material was examined was higher than the stan-
dard which he wished to apply."77
The justices of the majority did not dispute this statement, but they
noted that in the light of the particularly wide discretion conferred on the
Attorney General, and the thoroughness with which he had considered
the material, there was no room for the Court to annul his decision. In
other words, the Attorney General declared that he had acted in the mat-
ter of the Prime Minister in accordance with standards which were equal
to those applied in the case of ordinary citizens. This declaration was
inescapable from public scrutiny. Yet, in practice, he applied more
exacting standards to the case of the Prime Minister than was customary.
The consequential impression is that the Court was aware that the
Attorney General had applied strict standards, or at least suspected that
this was the case, but it was willing to acknowledge and accept this
exigency. Indeed, this is a clear example of the inevitable link between
the concern of the law with politics and politicians and the infiltration of
political considerations into the substance of the law and the legal
establishment.
In the United States, this problem is less prominent because there is
no link between ordinary criminal proceedings and the holding of office
by elected officials, whereas impeachment proceedings are conducted by
manifestly political authorities that openly take into account considera-
tions that differ from those weighed in ordinary criminal proceedings.78
As noted, immediately upon the publication of the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision (and again thereafter, with the publication of the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court) Prime Minister Netanyahu praised his
acquittal and the repudiation of the charges made against him. He did
77. H.C. 2534/97, Yahav v. State-Attorney, 51(3) P.D. 1, 36.
78. See also supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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not refer to the grave matters raised in the report issued by the Attorney-
General and the State-Attorney concerning the "puzzling aspects" of his
version of events and the affair as a whole, which raised "a real suspi-
cion" that there had been an "improper motive" for Bar-On's appoint-
ment. It is possible that there is no fault in the explanatory tactics
adopted by the Prime Minister, who is entitled to justify himself before
his electorate and before all the citizens of the country. Nevertheless,
his remarks also exploited a gap (of which the general public was
unlikely to be aware). This is the gap between the determination that the
evidence against the Prime Minister did not justify the far-reaching step
of filing an indictment against him and the conferral of public and ethi-
cal approval of his conduct.
The strict laws of evidence that are adapted to the needs of criminal
law, where it is sufficient to point to a reasonable doubt for an acquittal,
have therefore been transferred to the political arena, where it is doubtful
they were ever intended to apply.79 Clearly, the Prime Minister did not
emerge the loser from the application of criminal law standards to his
conduct. On the contrary, despite the embarrassing remarks in the
Attorney General and State Attorney's report in relation to his conduct
and the explanations offered by him, the Prime Minister could present
himself as someone exonerated by the professional, non-political estab-
lishment, by reason of his not having been put on trial. The legal han-
dling of his "suspicious" political actions actually conferred a political
benefit, which was obviously unintended by the report's authors. Some
people even speculated that the Prime Minister, who, as noted, sup-
ported the institution of a police inquiry into the affair, took that risk
believing the police would not find sufficient evidence to bring an
indictment against him. He indeed preferred this course of action to the
institution of a legal commission of inquiry, which might have rejected
the application of strict standards of evidence as accepted in criminal
proceedings, and might instead have recommended his dismissal from
office.
At this point it is illustrative to draw a comparison with the Ameri-
can Watergate and Clinton-Lewinsky Affairs. In the Watergate affair,
President Richard Nixon never was put on trial, having been pardoned
by his successor, President Gerald Ford. Nixon himself applied to the
Courts only over the issue of whether certain conversations held
between himself and his advisors enjoyed presidential privilege.80
79. This is because the standard of proof needed on the administrative-public level, and even
in circumstances where there is a possible violation of a basic right, is generally lower than the
standard of proof needed in criminal proceedings. See BARUCH BRACHA, n ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
305-306 (1996) (Hebrew).
80. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Senate Select Committee on
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Despite the criminal charges brought against some of Nixon's aids, it
appears as though the huge impact the affair had on American society,
culture, and politics did not arise primarily from the legal fact that cer-
tain acts were prohibited by penal law. As noted by one interviewee,
Rabbi Stewart Weiss, in a survey conducted among Israeli residents of
American origin following the Bar-On Affair:
The real issue in Watergate was not the crime itself, it was the cover
up and the tremendous arrogance and disregard for public senti-
ment .... [In the Bar-On Affair] I . . . don't get the sense of arro-
gance, and that was something else you had as a backdrop, this
tremendous antiestablishment feeling against the arrogance of Nixon
totally stonewalling [the investigation]. You didn't have the same
kind of "us against them" setup that you had then.81
Similar characteristics, notwithstanding the difference in their man-
ner of expression, became part of the political and public discourse in
the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair. The various decisions made during the
course of the impeachment proceedings instituted against President Clin-
ton were essentially guided by party considerations. The proceedings,
legal in form, were merely ceremonial. Their substance was political.
The fact that the open arguments and reasoning were all legal in charac-
ter, could not conceal the true nature of the proceedings, is reflected in
the almost exact division along party lines of the positions taken in the
various votes. This party division was particularly obvious in view of
the American system of government, which encourages the indepen-
dence of elected officials and weakens party discipline. The fact that the
recommendations of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr82 were also not
regarded as free from political prejudice certainly contributed to the bla-
tantly political nature of reactions to them.
The usual interpretation given to the constitutional provisions
regarding impeachment,83 provided in Article II, Section 4, of the Con-
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (1974); see also Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services Administration, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). This case law is widely
discussed in legal literature. See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term -
Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1974); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 31, at 236-40.
81. JERUSALEM POST, April 25, 1997.
82. KENNETH W. STARR, OFF. OF INDEP. COUNS., THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR (1998) (referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595 (c)).
83. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT (1999);
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974) and Akhil Reed Amar's forward to
the 1999 reprint; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS (1995); Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1989); JOHN R. LABOVTZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT (1978); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 289-96 (2d ed. 1988).
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stitution, illustrates the American politics-as-law attitude. Indeed, the
Constitution only empowers the Senate to remove the President, the
Vice-President, and other civil officers of the United States from office
if these persons are found guilty of the criminal offenses of "treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 84 The Senate is not
empowered to remove the President and other civil officers from office
on grounds of a political dispute, however serious, or for behavior that
does not fall within the limits of the offenses set out in the Constitution,
even if the behavior is immoral or makes the official unfit for her office.
The traditional interpretation of the Constitution, however, requires
that the grounds for removal from office disclose unfitness of the officer
for the office and take into account the significance, from a democratic
values point of view, of removal from office.8" Accordingly, particular
caution must be exercised in removing an elected President from office,
where the significance is the negation of the choice of the people.
Additionally, Congress' decisions during impeachment proceedings
are not subject to judicial review. The Senate sits in these proceedings
as a supreme court, and other courts are not entitled to interfere with its
decisions.86 The significance of this is that there is no way of compel-
ling Congress to follow substantive legal rules in relation to the
impeachment and removal of civil officers. In practice, the House of
Representatives may impeach, and the Senate may remove from office
civil officials, including the President, who have been proved to have
committed the offense of treason, bribery, or another high crime or mis-
demeanor. The opposite is also true. Notwithstanding the imperative
language of the Constitution, which provides that a person convicted of
an offense of this type by the Senate "shall be removed from office," the
Senate may refrain from removing civil officers from office even when
there is no doubt that cause exists for such removal. In exercising its
discretion Congress may thus weigh considerations. As noted, the Clin-
ton-Lewinsky Affair showed that many of Congress' members weighed
partisan considerations. They may also take ethical issues into account,
even if these are not within the ambit of their jurisdiction.
Thus, the grounds that American constitutional law provides for the
84. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 25.
85. See William Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 903 (1991).
86. See, e,g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of
Impeachments after Nixon, 43 DUKE L.J. 231 (1994). But see Robert S. Catz, Judicial Review of
Congressional Exercise of Impeachment Process, 40 KAN. L. REV. 853 (1992); Lisa A. Kainec,
Judicial Review of Senate Impeachment Proceedings: Is a Hands Off Approach Appropriate?, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1499 (1993); Thomas D. Amrine, Note, Judicial Review of Impeachment
Proceedings, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 809 (1993).
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removal from office of civil officers are connected to criminal law, but
they also take into account the moral, political, and democratic signifi-
cance of the displacement. Moreover, in the absence of any judicial
review, it is possible to weigh considerations other than those which are
criminal or which are formally permitted. Yet all this is carried out
within the framework of a traditional criminal trial even though the con-
tent is fundamentally political.
The ritual of a criminal trial in which certain political and ethical
decisions are made in the United States fulfills a dual function. On one
hand, it provides a legitimate instrument for making grave decisions, at
least some of which infringe upon the democratic choices of the public.
Removal from office on the basis of a conviction may be perceived as
more legitimate than displacement in a routine political-administrative
process. On the other hand, the ritual of a criminal trial contributes to
restraint of Congress itself in the exercise of its powers. Even if the
members of Congress do not restrict their deliberations to legal-criminal
considerations, the ritual in which decisions are made symbolizes the
thoughtfulness and restraint which society expects of them. Even if the
House of Representatives may impeach, and the Senate may remove
from office, on the basis of party political or moral-ethical considera-
tions, the ritual of a criminal trial prevents this from being done, save
when these considerations are weighty, from the point of view of the
members of Congress and in public perception.
This ensures the stability of American government institutions that
seem to be the greatest in the world. In Israel, for example, even after
the shift from the election of the Prime Minister by the Parliament to his
direct election by the people, the Knesset may remove her from office in
an ordinary parliamentary procedure. There is no need for impeachment
or for any other criminal ritual. It suffices to show ordinary political
grounds, such as disagreement with the policy of the Prime Minister,
and, even for the sake of appearances, there is no need for the Knesset to
bring charges against her. 7 This state of affairs encourages continuous
efforts to bring down the Prime Minister. One of these efforts recently
succeeded.
In contrast, a determination by the American Senate within the
impeachment process, whether there is an acquittal or a conviction, does
not amount to a public closure. The openly political character of the
process derogates from the public's confidence in it. The legal cere-
mony with which it is held does not compensate for this. Almost para-
doxically, it is actually the legal determination, which seeks to reflect
the law rather than the public view, that has the potential to attract public
87. See 1992, S.H. 214.
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confidence beyond that which is attracted by decisions made by clearly
representative political branches.
At the same time, it seems that the gap between the law and public
opinion is wider in Israel than in the United States, where the legal
establishment is not perceived to be totally detached from the political
legislative and executive branches. Whereas the significance and polit-
ical consequences of the Watergate and Clinton-Lewinsky Affairs
ensued from the political and moral construction given them by the pub-
lic, Israel's Bar-On Affair was judged mainly by its criminal implica-
tions. Following the finding that there was no room for criminal
sanctions to be imposed against the heads of government (except for
Knesset Member Deri), the incident as a whole was perceived as essen-
tially legitimate, and, in any event, not one that justified unusual public
or political scrutiny beyond the legal inquiry already conducted.
B. Minister of Justice
With regard to Minister of Justice Hanegbi, there was no evidence
that he was a participant in or aware of the conspiracy alleged to have
existed between Bar-On and Knesset Member Deft. It became clear,
however, that the Minister avoided making a report to the cabinet with
regard to the stance taken by Chief Justice Aharon Barak, with whom
the Minister had spoken shortly before the cabinet meeting in which the
Bar-On appointment was recommended. In that conversation, which has
become something of a constitutional custom in Israel, the Chief Justice
made clear to Hanegbi his opinion that Bar-On was not a suitable candi-
date for the post of Attorney General. With regard to this conduct of the
Minister of Justice, the State Attorney wrote, and the Attorney General
agreed, that it reflected a "deviation from proper norms of conduct," but
did not amount to a criminal offense.88
This opinion is correct. Not every political scheme that involves
lack of complete honesty and deviates from "proper norms of conduct"
is a criminal offense that should impose on the person engaged in the
scheme the stigma of an "offender" and expose her to criminal sanctions
of imprisonment, fines, and the like. The Minister of Justice neverthe-
less presented himself to the public not as one whose acts were found
not to be criminal, but as one whose conduct had been legitimized. It is
doubtful whether one should criticize a political figure who does his best
to explain himself and defend his reputation before his electorate. As
with the case of the Prime Minister, the political gains that politicians
88. See Decision no. 3164/97, supra note 64.
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may earn from having their conduct pass through the filter of the crimi-
nal legal system is exposed.
The substance and objectives of the criminal system were not
intended to determine the public or moral propriety of the conduct of
political figures. Much of the public, however, is unaware of this, and it
is therefore possible to manipulate public opinion in such a way that it
equates the absence of criminal guilt with moral and public propriety.
C. Judicial Review of the Attorney-General's Decisions
Since the early 1980s,89 the Israeli Supreme Court has been pre-
pared to engage in judicial review of decisions to indict. In this context,
the position in Israel is different than the prevailing climate in the United
States, where, as a rule, the courts refrain from judicial review of indict-
ment decisions.90 In the United States, on the other hand, competent
public figures are not detached from politics, and some even are elected
by the citizens.
The central reason for forbidding judicial review of indictment
decisions in the United States is the separation of powers principle. The
executive branch is exclusively responsible for filing indictments, a
function which it performs, by taking into account political considera-
tions that are outside the sphere of the judicial authorities. Judge Jones
commented on the separation of powers doctrine:
The executive power is vested in the President of the United States,
who is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The
Attorney-General is the hand of the President in taking care that the
laws of the United States in legal proceedings and in prosecution of
offenses, be faithfully executed.... The discretionary power of the
attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecution
shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of
policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause. Although
as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer
of the Court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the govern-
ment, and it is as an officer of the executive department that he exer-
cises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a
particular case. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separa-
tion of powers, that the Courts' are not to interfere with the free exer-
cise of the discretionary powers of the attorney of the United States in
their control over criminal prosecutions.
91
Conversely, Israel has no similar fundamental obstacle to judicial
89. See H.C. 329/81, Nof v. Attorney-General, 37(4) P.D. 326.
90. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1973); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992).
91. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
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review of the Attorney General's decisions. This consideration is gener-
ally not raised as a concern leading to the Court's decision not to inter-
vene 92 because the common perception in Israel does not regard the
judicial review of the legality of actions of other branches as a violation
of the separation of powers. It regards judicial review as the proper
fulfillment of judicial functions.93 Further, in practice, the Attorney
General, by reason of the autonomous and apolitical nature of the office,
is perceived to be a part of the legal establishment, which is as close to
the judiciary as it is to the executive branch. 94
To date, the Israeli Supreme Court has annulled the decision of the
Attorney General in relation to the filing of indictments in only two
cases. 95 While the Court purported to exercise its review on the basis of
all the grounds of judicial review applicable to administrative decisions,
its judgments essentially concentrated on the grounds of lack of
reasonableness.
Normally, a decision of a public authority may be annulled by the
Court if the authority attributes unreasonable relative weight, which no
reasonable authority would have attributed, to the various relevant con-
siderations. As a rule, a number of options are available from which an
authority may choose to exercise discretion; these options are located in
the "zone of reasonableness." '96 Only an option that is plainly outside
the "zone of reasonableness" will be regarded as unlawful and
annulled. 97
In practice, the connection exists between the development of the
unreasonableness ground for judicial review, which was shaped into its
modern form in the 1980s98 and the development of the willingness for
92. For criticism of this, see an article of the Attorney-General who preceded Bar-On,
Michael Ben-Yair, Judicial Review in Israel of the Attorney-General's Decisions Concerning Law
Enforcement, 5 PLILIM (IsR. J. CRIM. L.) 5, 19-23 (1996).
93. See, e.g., H.C. 910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42(2) P.D. 441, 463.
94. For the contention that the Attorney-General in Israel has actually become a separate
authority, see Eli M. Salzberger, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and the Role of the
Attorney-General in Israel, 5 PLILIM (IsR. J. CRIM. L.) 149 (1996).
95. See H.C. 223/88, Sheftel v. Attorney-General, 43(4) P.D. 356; H.C. 935/89, Ganor v.
Attorney-General, 44(2) P.D. 485: H.C. 7074/93, Suissa v. Attorney-General, 48(2) P.D. 748
(requiring the Attorney-General to order the continuation of an investigation into the possibility of
instituting disciplinary proceedings against the Inspector-General of the Police). In another case,
the Supreme Court annulled a decision of the Military Advocate General, whose power to decide
on the indictment of soldiers corresponds to that of the Attorney-General in relation to civilians,
not to bring criminal proceedings against an officer. See H.C. 425/89, Tsufan v. Military
Advocate-General, 43(4) P.D. 718.
96. See Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Law, THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL SURVEYS 51, 71-
73 (Itzhal Zamir & Sylviane Colomob eds. 1995).
97. See Itzhak Zamir, Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Proportionality, in PUBLIC
LAW IN ISRAEL 327, 327-30 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996).
98. See H.C. 389/80, Gold Pages Ltd. v. The Broadcasting Authority, 35(1) P.D. 421.
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judicial review of the decisions of the Attorney General. The unreasona-
bleness ground, which is presented by the Court as a substantive rule of
lawfulness,99 is used cautiously. In practice, however, it has no life of
its own outside the scope of judicial review. During the nearly twenty
years in which courts exercised judicial review under the ground of
unreasonableness, less than twenty decisions have been annulled on this
ground. As previously noted, two of these have been decisions of the
Attorney General.
The ground of unreasonableness is of great value because it forces
authorities, including the Attorney General, to be prepared to justify
their decisions and actions. Only in rare cases, however, will a decision
be annulled by the Court on grounds of lack of reasonableness. As a
result, the ground is more than an effective review of administrative
decisions. It is a means of conferring unintended judicial approval and
legitimization of them.
The Bar-On Affair provides an interesting illustration of this phe-
nomenon. In the judgment concerning the Attorney General's decision
not to indict Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Court held that the decision
lay on the borderline of reasonableness, within "the gray area."" In the
opinion of the Court, the decision was not "reasonable" within the ordi-
nary meaning of the word, but the Court was not willing to hold that it
was "unreasonable in an extreme manner."
A supporting opinion by Justice Theodore Orr, along with Deputy
Chief Justice Shlomo Levin and Justice Itzhak Zamir, clarified that a
distinction should be drawn between the Attorney General and other
authorities. 101 The Court held that its decision to refrain from interven-
ing in the decision of the Attorney General was made against the back-
ground of the wider than usual "zone of reasonableness" afforded to the
Attorney General and the particularly extensive credit to which he was
entitled. Nevertheless, the Attorney General's decision fell within the
''gray area" that lies on the border of annulment.
The Prime Minister and Minister of Justice were not the only par-
ties who praised the decision of the Supreme Court. °2 Even the Attor-
ney General and his staff expressed satisfaction with the determination
of the Court relating to the "reasonableness" of the decision, particularly
its decision to refrain from issuing a decree nisi in respect of it."°3 Here
99. See, e.g., H.C. 3094/93, The Movement for Quality of Governance, 47(5) P.D. at 420.
100. H.C. 2534/97, Yahav, 51(3) P.D. at 25.
101. Id. at 27-33.
102. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated: "I'm very happy with the decision of the High Court. I
think this is a day that has made all citizens of Israel happy." JERUSALEM POST, June 16, 1997.
103. The Director of the Petitions Division in the State-Attorney's Office, Uzi Fogleman, who
represented the Attorney-General and the State-Attorney in the Supreme Court, said that "the
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too, it appears that the general public was not aware of the niceties of the
distinction between non-intervention on the part of the Court and a posi-
tive determination by the Court that the decision was reasonable and
proper.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Bar-On Affair is another
example of how the exercise of judicial review of a decision may, con-
trary to its purpose, become a tool which confers substantive public
legitimacy on that decision.
V. THE DECISION NOT TO REMOVE MINISTER OF JUSTICE FROM
OFFICE, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW THEREOF
As a result of the Bar-On Affair, a petition was filed asking the
Court to order that Tzahi Hanegbi be removed from his position from
the office of Minister of Justice. The petitioner relied on the opinion of
the State-Attorney, which stated that even if Hanegbi's conduct did not
amount to a criminal offense, it still comprised a "deviation from proper
norms of behavior."" The petitioner asked that the Prime Minister be
required to exercise his powers in accordance with Section 35(b) of
Basic Law, which states, in pertinent part, that to remove a minister
from office, the Government must use the powers conferred under Sec-
tion 39(a)(2) of this Basic Law, which changes the distribution of func-
tions of the ministers.10 5 This petition was also dismissed, but this time
against the dissenting opinion of Justice Goldberg. 06
In the eyes of an American jurist, a petition of this type probably
would be regarded as fairly surprising. In terms of American law, the
power to appoint and dismiss State Secretaries is located exclusively
within the province of the elected political authorities, i.e., the President
and Congress, and the Supreme Court would regard it as a clearly "polit-
ical question," in which it would not intervene.' 7 This is not the case in
Israel. A number of years ago, the identical petitioner succeeded in per-
suading the Supreme Court to order the Prime Minister to dismiss a
bottom line was that the Court had upheld the State's version as being reasonable." The Attorney-
General himself, Elyakim Rubinstein, stated, "There is no universal truth and there are always
dissenting opinions about what is right or wrong." JERUSALEM POST, June 16, 1997. These
comments, which referred to the minority opinion of Justice Dorner, imply that in the opinion of
the Attorney-General, the majority had held that his opinion was "right."
104. See Decision no. 3164/97, supra note 64.
105. S.H. 1992, at 214.
106. H.C. 2533/97, The Movement for Quality of Governance in Israel v. The Government of
Israel, 51(3) P.D. 46.
107. For a summary of the "political question" doctrine, see JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS
DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUT SHELL 47-53 (2d ed., 1991); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability And Separation Of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393,
498-99 (1996).
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minister charged with offenses of corruption."°8
Justice Zamir, who wrote the leading opinion in the petition to
require the Prime Minister to remove Minister of Justice Hanegbi from
office, refrained from a rigid delineation of the duty to remove a minis-
ter from office in the event that an indictment for a serious offense was
filed. In his words, "one should not negate the possibility that the con-
duct of a minister... in a certain case, even if it does not amount to a
criminal offense, will be serious in a sufficiently extreme manner, so that
it would be unreasonable in the extreme to enable him to continue in
office."'"
The Court nevertheless dismissed the petition requiring the Prime
Minister to remove Minister of Justice Hanegbi from office. This was
due to the fact such a duty would be imposed only in rare and excep-
tional circumstances when an indictment is not filed. Hangebi's case did
not meet these criteria. Justice Zamir wrote, "There is a great gap
between an extreme case such as this which forms an exception to the
rule, and a wide rule which invalidates a minister or deputy minister in
every case of conduct which exceeds the norms of proper behavior."11
The Supreme Court considered the fact that the use of judicial force
to exercise the power to dismiss a minister creates tension between the
Court, "which is largely built on values,""I 1 and democracy, "which is
primarily built on representation." '112 The Court stated, "[I]t is for the
Court to balance these interests."' " 3 In this balance, wrote Justice
Zamir, "[L]aw cannot, and should not, replace ethics, except in a partial
manner, in respect of a particular point, in a cautious and supervised
fashion.""' 4 Quoting another judgment, which he had also written, Jus-
tice Zamir added, "[T]he Court must also consider, inter alia, the reali-
ties of life, which sometimes lead the public to ask to be represented by
a person who is not a model of proper behavior."' 15 As in earlier cases
on similar issues, the Israeli Supreme Court refrained from referring to
the separation of powers doctrine, which underlies the American polit-
ical question doctrine, as a ground for a court's self-restraint when con-
sidering the dismissal of a minister.
Consistent with their reactions to the other legal decisions dis-
108. H.C.J. 4267/93, Amiti - Citizens for Proper Administration and Purity of Standards v.
Prime Minister, 47(5) P.D. 441.
109. H.C. 2533/97, The Movement for Quality of Governance, at 63.
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 63.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 62.
115. A.S.S. (Appeal of the State Service) 4123/95, Orr v. State of Israel - State Service
Ombudsman, 49(5) P.D. 184, 190.
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cussed above, the public figures involved here expressed their satisfac-
tion with the judgment.11 6 In practice, despite feeble political efforts to
force the Prime Minister to transfer Hanegbi from the Ministry of Justice
to another Government ministry, Hanegbi remained in office. His polit-
ical strength exceeded that of his opponents. The attempt to remove him
from office by means of a petition for judicial relief was left as the sole
significant effort to impose political sanctions on him for his conduct in
the Bar-On Affair.
This discussion clarifies that, while the Israeli Supreme Court
upheld the right to judicial review of nominations for ministerial posi-
tions, it also greatly restricted its actual intervention in such matters.
The legal and judicial treatment of this matter is the principal, and often
the sole, way of scrutinizing such nominations. In that respect, there is
little basis for Justice Orr's words concerning the "variety of means of
scrutiny," which allegedly applies to the oversight of Government work.
From a different point of view, however, the legal standards may be met
easily by politicians who are not corrupt or who have not been proven
corrupt according to legal evidentiary tests. Moreover, the refusal of the
Court to intervene is construed by politicians concerned in the matter.
The general public, which looks only at the judgments' bottom lines also
attempts to legitimize and justify substantively the conduct at issue.
It is interesting to speculate as to the political result in the United
States of non-disclosure by a Secretary of State (or other senior official)
of data relevant to a decision which that official has asked the authority
to make to a competent authority, such as a congressional committee.' 17
The likelihood is that even though the Court would not intervene, the
official would be dismissed or resign from her post, as the "deceived"
authority. Public opinion would probably find it difficult to accept that
such an official should continue to remain in office.
VI. THE DECISION NOT TO ESTABLISH A LEGAL COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW THEREOF
A. The Nature of a Legal Commission of Inquiry in Israel, its
Powers, and the Purposes for which it is Established
The subject of legal commissions of inquiry, established in accord-
ance with the Commissions of Inquiry Act of 1968,118 has achieved con-
stitutional importance in Israel. This is unlike the situation of any other
country. A legal commission of inquiry, despite its English origins in
116. See JERUSALEM POST, June 16, 1997.
117. In the United States there is no "government" in the Israeli format of a cabinet which
comprises all the ministers and stands at the head of the executive branch.
118. 1968, S.H. 28.
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England119 and other countries influenced by the English system of law
such as Canada and Australia, is an institution unique to Israel.12 0 In the
United States, no institution performs a similar function. 121 Inquiries,
which in Israel are subjected to legal commissions of inquiry headed by
judges, are traditionally conducted in the United States by congressional
committees. 122
Israel's Commission directs political questions into legal judicial
channels. 2 3 The commission of inquiry, which was originally an arm of
the Government, has become a judicial institution. Some see it as epito-
mizing the infiltration by the executive branch into matters that were
within the competence of the judiciary,124 because it often deals with
political matters, or with matters that involve questions of policy.
The principal elements of the Israeli Commissions of Inquiry Act
are as follows: Section 1 of the Act provides, "When it appears to the
Government that a matter exists which is at the time of vital public
importance and requires clarification, it may decide to set up a commis-
sion of inquiry which shall inquire into the matter and shall make a
report to it.'1' 25
At the head of the commission stands a judge or a retired judge of
the Supreme Court or a District Court.1 26 The chairman and members of
the commission are selected by the Chief Justice.' 2 Like court proceed-
ings, those summoned before the Commission have a duty to testify
before a Commission of Inquiry and produce documents for it.128 The
Commission is entitled to appoint evidence collectors on its behalf, and
119. See Ze'ev Segal, The Power to Probe into Matters of Vital Public Importance, 58 TUL. L.
REv. 941, 941-942 (1984).
120. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 834.
121. Although, in exceptional cases, a special ad hoc committee chaired by a judge is
appointed, which investigates matters of public importance. An example of such a committee is
the committee chaired by Justice Earl Warren, which was appointed to investigate the murder of
President John F. Kennedy.
122. See JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER To PROBE (1977); PHnLP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 17-33 (1978); TRIBE, supra note 83, at 287-89. It should be pointed out
that in Israel too, the committees of the Knesset have the power to institute an investigation. See
Basic Law: The Knesset, Section 22. Use of this power, however, is rare, and investigations
conducted by these committees do not attract the same public prestige as investigations conducted
by the United States Congress (or by the legal commissions of inquiry in Israel).
123. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 834.
124. See Ze'ev Segal, Commission of Inquiry According to the Commissions of Inquiry Law,
1968: Its Constitutional Status and its Legitimate Scope of Action, 3 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 199, 206
(1984) (Hebrew).
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an attorney who is not in the State Service to assist it. 129 The Commis-
sion is required to allow a person who is likely to be harmed by the
inquiry or its results to be heard, as well as to allow her to review evi-
dence which is in the Commission's possession, examine witnesses, and
bring evidence before the commission. 130 Therefore, the Commission is
not bound to follow the other rules of procedure or rules of evidence
applied to courts. Instead, it may decide these matters at its discre-
tion.13 ' The Attorney-General may, by herself or through her represen-
tative, appear before the Commission and examine witnesses.1 32
As a rule, the deliberations of the Commission are public and the
report prepared by it is published. However, the report may be kept
secret where necessary, "in the interest of protecting the security of the
State, the foreign relations of the State, a vital economic interest of the
State or secret methods of operation of the Israel Police, or to safeguard
morality or the welfare of a person."' 33 At the conclusion of its work,
the Commission submits a report to the Government, setting out the
results of its inquiry, "and its recommendations, if it sees fit to add rec-
ommendations."'' 34 In practice, commissions of inquiry routinely make
recommendations on personal matters and even political issues. Often,
where the factual findings are subsidiary, the recommendations become
a primary subject of "investigation."' 35
Section 28(a) of the Act clarifies that "this Act shall not derogate
from the power of a minister to appoint an investigation commission to
examine any matter within the scope of his functions."'' 3
6
As noted, legal commissions of inquiry are not generally satisfied
with merely determining the facts. Their primary activity and the ration-
ale for their existence is to make recommendations. Examples of legal
commissions' recommendations arise from commission inquiries into
the methods of investigation of the General Security Services into terror-
ist activities (reported in 1988) inquiries into the functioning and effi-
ciency of the health service (reported in 1990).
In the petitions filed in the Bar-On Affair asking the Court to
require the Government to appoint a commission of inquiry to investi-
gate the affair, it was argued that while the police were engaged in a







135. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 840.
136. See 1968, S.H. 28.
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of public interest that required investigation by a commission of inquiry.
What were these questions? Some of the more relevant ones are: what
was the proper conduct in the appointment of the Attorney General;
what are the lessons which should be learned in order to prevent a repe-
tition of the errors committed in the appointment of an Attorney General
in the future; how should public responsibility be shared by the Prime
Minister, Minister of Justice, and other public figures who were
involved in this affair?' 37
In other words, the petitioners did not demand that the commission
investigate questions of fact. They asked that it investigate questions of
policy and questions relating to personal responsibility. The Supreme
Court confirmed that despite the thorough police investigation into the
affair, the power (even if not a duty) to appoint a legal commission of
inquiry for these purposes existed. 38
It is generally accepted that the factual findings of a legal commis-
sion of inquiry are binding on the Government. 39 To what extent do the
recommendations of such a commission also bind the Government? A
distinction is made between two types of recommendations: (1) personal
recommendations, which relate to the guilt of office holders and their
responsibility for the events that are the subject of the inquiry and sanc-
tions which should be imposed upon them, and (2) recommendations
relating to the proper policy that should be adopted in relation to the
matter from that point forward. Recommendations of the first type usu-
ally are recognized as binding, amounting especially to a court sen-
tence. 140 In the past, legal commissions of inquiry recommended the
dismissal or removal from office of, among others, the Army Chief of
Staff and other senior officers,"' bank managers (including the manag-
ers of a private bank), 4 2 and even, as noted before, a minister. 43 These
recommendations were fully implemented. Indeed, matters reached
such proportions that if a commission of inquiry refrained from making
a personal recommendation in relation to a certain official whose con-
137. See H.C. 2624/97, Ronel v. Government of Israel, 51(3) P.D. 71, 85.
138. See id. at 81.
139. See AVIGDOR KLAGSBALD, TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY IN ISRAEL 318 (1987) (Hebrew).
However, this is generally subject to the findings not being contrary to the judgment of a
competent Court. See H.C. 152/82, Alon v. Government of Israel, 36(4) P.D. 449, 459.
140. See Itzhak Zamir, Commissions of Inquiry From a Legal Point of View, 35 HAPRAKLIT
323 (1984).
141. The Commission of Inquiry into the October 1973 War, chaired by Chief Justice Shimon
Agranat, made this recommendation in reports issued'in 1974 and 1975.
142. The Commission of Inquiry into the mismanagement of bank shares, chaired by Justice of
the Supreme Court Moshe Beisky, made this recommendation in a report issued in 1986.
143. The Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camp in Beirut, chaired by
Chief Justice Itzhak Cahan, recommended in a report issued in 1983 that the Minister of Defense,
Ariel Sharon, be removed from office.
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duct was found to be improper, for example, because in the meantime
she had resigned from office and there was no longer any point in rec-
ommending her dismissal, such inaction was perceived by the media and
the public as an "acquittal."'"
In contrast, the Government is not regarded as being bound by rec-
ommendations that relate to general policy that should be adopted in the
future in connection with the subject matter of the inquiry. In practice,
governments often have refused to implement such recommendations. 145
Against this background one may understand the apologetic comments
of the commission of inquiry into the massacre at the Cave of the
Patriarchs in Hebron, which refrained from making personal
recommendations.
The point on which the hearings of the commission have
focused is the "matter" for which the investigation was established.
Conclusions of a personal nature are not outside the scope of opera-
tion of the commission. [Yet] it is possible that the matter under
investigation primarily raises general questions, of an institutional
nature... the commission is not a Court which determines the fate of
a person .. .but its purpose is to acts as a legal tool, which the
legislator created to assist in the investigation of a matter of public
importance ... and the main effort must be directed to this end. 146
These comments may well reflect the most appropriate practice.
However, they do not seem to express the actual political and public
culture of Israel. In view of the fact that "institutional" recommenda-
tions are not regarded as binding, the primary practical, political, and
public significance of a legal commission of inquiry lies in its recom-
mendations on personal issues. Thus, generally, an Israeli political
leader or other senior official in the executive branch (such as the Chief
of Staff) will not resign and will not be dismissed by reason of his fail-
ings unless a legal body so orders.' 47 A legal commission of inquiry is a
legal institution which, in addition to the courts, is perceived as compe-
144. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 842.
145. For instance, many of the structural recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry
regarding the health system were not implemented by the Government; and the same goes for
recommendations concerning security issues of the Commission of Inquiry that was appointed to
review the reasons for Israel's unreadiness for the 1973 Yom Kippur war. See RUBINSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 841-43.
146. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT INTO THE MASSACRE AT THE CAVE OF
THE PATRIARCHS IN HEBRON 214 (1994).
147. An exception to this rule occurred in the case of Prime Minister Golda Meir, who
resigned together with her government following heavy public pressure. The resignations came
despite the fact that the commission of inquiry into the October 1973 War did not impose on her
or the Minister of Defense personal responsibility for the failings which occurred prior to the
outbreak of the war.
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tent to impose binding political sanctions on senior officials who have
failed in their functions.
What standards guide a legal commission of inquiry in deciding
whether or not to attribute personal responsibility for the occurrence of
mistakes? It would seem that an act that is wrongful from a legal per-
spective, such as a criminal act, a tort, or a breach of a rule of constitu-
tional or administrative law, also would attract personal responsibility by
a commission of inquiry, and, where necessary, be subject to a recom-
mendation by the commission that sanctions be imposed. Moreover, the
commission inquiring into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut,
headed by Chief Justice Itzhak Cahan, held that a commission of inquiry
should consider, not only the legal aspects of the matter under investiga-
tion, but also its public and moral aspects.1 48 Still, the commission
would not recommend sanctions if the relevant minister bore only parlia-
mentary political responsibility, as distinct from personal responsibility.
Despite indications that legal commissions of inquiry may recom-
mend the dismissal of senior political officials, in circumstances where
the Court will not order such an action to be taken, legal commissions of
inquiry are as wary of exercising their power to recommend personal
sanctions as are the courts. Testifying to this is the fact that, to date, a
Commission of Inquiry has recommended the dismissal of minister only
once.
Despite the caution and restraint generally exercised by Israeli
commissions of inquiry in making personal recommendations, these
commissions undoubtedly represent a threat to officials of the executive
branch, whether politicians or non-politicians. This threat is aggravated
by the fact that the investigation is not subject to purely "legal" stan-
dards, but it is also likely to be based on more general public and moral
considerations. In contrast to judicial review, for which politicians have
no control, the power to appoint a legal commission of inquiry is con-
ferred on the Government.' 49 Accordingly, the Government may order
148. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN
BEIRUT 76 (1983) (Hebrew).
149. Another route for establishing a commission of inquiry is set up by section 14(b) of the
State Comptroller Act [Consolidated Version], 1958, which provides:
When an inspection [by the State Comptroller] has revealed defects or
infringements which the Comptroller, in view of their bearing upon a fundamental
problem or in the interests of upholding moral standards or for any other reason,
deems worthy of consideration by the Committee [of the Knesset for matters
relating to the State Comptroller]. . he shall submit a separate report to the
Committee; and upon his doing so, the Committee may, of its own motion or upon
the proposal of the Comptroller, decide upon the appointment of a commission of
inquiry;... subject to any necessary changes, the provisions of the Commission of
Inquiry Act, 1968, shall apply to the said commission.
2000]
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the establishment of a commission of inquiry in matters in which it has
an interest in a commission investigation, even if there are conflicting
views as to whether it falls within the definition of "a matter which is at
the time of vital public importance and requires clarification" as required
by section 1 of the Act.'50 In the past, the Government of Israel has
ordered the establishment of commissions of inquiry on policy matters
that it has felt uncomfortable deciding itself, in the hope that the prestige
of the legal establishment would ease public acceptance of the difficult
decisions that are to be reached in these matters.
Thus, for example, the commission of inquiry into the functioning
and efficiency of the health service, headed by Justice Shoshana Netany-
ahu, was set up in 1989 against the background of the politically diffi-
cult task of setting policy in the area of public health and hospitalization.
In connection with this Commission of Inquiry, it was written that:
It is difficult to correlate the judicial character of this commission...
with the matter that it has been required to investigate. The only
explanation for this appointment lies in considerations which are ,not
relevant: the desire to postpone difficult decisions and rely on an
external body, possessing legal prestige, in order to adopt conclusions
which are likely to be unpopular, or the adoption of which will entail
confrontation with interested parties.' 5 '
I am doubtful, however, whether the considerations referred to by
this commentator are in fact "not relevant." In the legal-political culture
of Israel (described above in a different context) the legal establishment
has achieved a public status that empowers it and sometimes obliges it
to participate in making decisions of a political nature.152 It is debatable
whether this is a desirable situation but it is doubtful if one may regard a
decision that reflects this phenomenon as being based on irrelevant
considerations.
The significance of empowering the Government to decide on the
A similar arrangement is provided by Section 14(b)(l) in respect to another type of report
that may be submitted by the State Comptroller. But this course, too, is conditional upon the
establishment of a commission of inquiry by virtue of a decision of a Knesset committee, and all
the Knesset committees contain a majority of members affiliated with the coalition. In other
words, in practice, the Government has control over Kresset decisions, and has the power to
ensure that the committees refrain from making decisions that are particularly displeasing to it.
150. 1968, S.H. 28.
151. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 844-45.
152. It should be noted that, from this point of view, a legal commission of inquiry is unique in
that the initiative for the appointment must come from the political authorities. In contrast to other
contexts, where the Court has ways of evading the issue and refusing to intervene in what is
essentially a political question, the decision to appoint a legal commission of inquiry and the
determination of its scope of operation are within the exclusive power of the Government, and the
capacity of the judiciary to evade the political burden imposed on it by the executive branch is
limited.
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establishment of a legal commission of inquiry lies in the Government's
power to prevent the establishment of such a commission. The Govern-
ment may prevent the establishment of the commission even in a matter
which should properly be investigated, where it is likely that responsibil-
ity will be laid at the door of Government ministers or other senior offi-
cials of the executive branch and particularly where the Government can
anticipate recommendations that personal sanctions be imposed. It is
unlikely that the Government would decide on such a hazardous course
of action on its own initiative.
Indeed, Israeli history proves that commissions of inquiry that rec-
ommended the imposition of personal sanctions were set up by the Gov-
ernment as a result of substantial public pressure.1 53 Despite the fact
that the conferral of power on the Government to decide on the appoint-
ment of a legal commission of inquiry involves a manifest conflict of
interest that is exemplified by the Bar-On Affair, it is doubtful whether
there is any other institution, besides the Government, which could be
empowered to decide on the establishment of legal commissions of
inquiry.
In any event, the Government may find it difficult to revoke the
establishment of a legal commission of inquiry if it were demanded by
the President of the State (which in Israel is a symbolic, apolitical office)
or by the State Comptroller (who in recent years has enjoyed wide pub-
lic esteem). As noted, each of these officials was involved in the estab-
lishment of commissions of inquiry for which the Government had little
enthusiasm.
B. Judicial Review of the Establishment of Legal Commissions
of Inquiry
May the Court order the Government to appoint a legal commission
of inquiry? One can question whether the judiciary will require the
executive to set up a body possessing power to impose sanctions on
members of the Government on the basis of public or moral considera-
tions, which are outside of the Court's jurisdiction.
During the Bar-On Affair, a number of petitions were submitted on
153. This was the case in relation to the Agranat Commission, dealing with the October 1973
War; the Cahan Commission, dealing with the massacre in the refugee camps in Beirut (which
was largely set up as a result of a call for a commission made by the President of the State); and
the Beisky Commission, relating to the mishandling of bank shares, an affair which resulted in a
major crisis for the Israeli economy and the government having to pay out huge sums of money to
stabilize the situation. The latter commission was set up in 1985 by virtue of a decision of the
Committee of the Knesset concerned with the State Comptroller, following a harsh report by the
State Comptroller, and the government was not involved in its establishment at all (although, in
view of the gravity of the affair, the government was also not in a position to oppose it).
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this issue. One petition asked the Court itself to impose political sanc-
tions, namely, the removal of the Minister of Justice from office, and it
was dismissed.' 54 The petitioners asking for the establishment of a legal
commission of inquiry hoped that such a commission, whose considera-
tions were more extensive than the "legal" considerations governing the
Court, and expressly included political and moral matters would do what
the Court was unable or unwilling to do. One may assume that the peti-
tioners also believed that the evidentiary standards applied by a legal
commission of inquiry would be less strict than those underlying the
undisturbed decision of the Attorney-General not to indict the Prime
Minister. These hopes and beliefs probably were unfounded. Whatever
the case, the Court decided to dismiss all petitions asking for the estab-
lishment of a legal commission of inquiry. In doing so, it refused to give
the petitioners an opportunity to satisfy their political ambitions indi-
rectly, after having already dismissed petitions for equivalent direct
relief. The grounds for dismissing the petitions indicate that even if
there is a theoretical possibility for the Court to force the Government to
set up a legal commission of inquiry, in practice, the Court will refuse to
do so.
Even assuming that the Bar-On Affair was a matter of vital public
importance, "IT]his was insufficient to require the Government to
appoint a commission of inquiry specifically on this matter among the
variety of other matters which also possessed greater or lesser public
importance." 155 Thus, among the various types of governmental powers,
the power to appoint a commission of inquiry is one of the widest. This
is because it is conferred on the highest authority in the executive
branch, the cabinet. It is also true in light of the language of the empow-
ering provision. The commission of inquiry's power to make personal
recommendations, on the basis of public and moral considerations is not
a reason for requiring the Government to make such an appointment. 156
VII. FROM POLITICS-AS-LAW TO THE POLITICS OF LAW
A. The Politics-as-Law Phenomenon in Israel
and in the United States
In Israel, legal rules and the legal establishment, as led by the
Supreme Court embrace all affairs of the State and the public, including
matters which are customarily regarded as "political". 1 57 As a rule, the
154. See H.C. 2533/97, The Movement for Quality of Governance, 51(3) P.D. 46.
155. H.C. 2624/97, Ronel, 51(3) P.D., at 80.
156. See H.C. 6001/97, Amitai - Citizens for Improvement of Administration and Purity of
Ethics v. Prime Minister (not yet published).
157. See Shimon Shetreet, Standing and Justiciability, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 265 (Itzhak
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Israeli legal establishment does not refrain from dealing with a dispute
brought to it for adjudication merely because of its political aspects.
Justice Barak has discussed the concept underlying this approach:
Every action - whether it be political or a matter of policy - is
embraced by the world of law, and there is a legal rule taking a posi-
tion in respect of it, permitting or prohibiting it. The contention that
"the issue was not a legal issue but a clearly political issue", mixes
what cannot be mixed. The fact that a matter is "clearly political"
cannot displace the fact that it is also a "legal" matter.158
Indeed, numerous political disputes in Israel take the form of legal
disputes. In addition to the cases already referred to in this article, peti-
tions have been submitted to the Courts in recent years seeking to pro-
hibit the Israeli Government from conducting negotiations with Syria in
relation to the withdrawal from the Golan Heights;159 to annul the Gov-
ernment's policy in relation to the settlement of Jews in the Territo-
ries; 6 0 to prohibit the Government from signing political agreements
with Palestinian organizations;1 61 to prevent the implementation of
agreements between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Author-
ity in relation to the release of Palestinian prisoners;1 62 and to negate
political agreements between parties. 163  To date, numerous petitions
have been submitted by Knesset members against decisions of the Knes-
set Chairman or other Knesset authorities in relation to the regulation of
its work."6  Some of these petitions have been upheld.1 65 In others
Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds. 1996); Ariel Bendor, Parties: Between Law and Politics, SAN DIEGEO
INT.LA. REV. (forthcoming).
158. H.C. 910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42(2) P.D. 441, 547.
159. See H.C. 4354/92, Movement of the Land of Israel and Temple Mount Faithful v. The
Prime Minister, 47(1) P.D. 37.
160. See H.C. 4481/91, Bargil v. Government of Israel, 47(4) P.D. 210 (petition against the
establishment of settlements in the administered territories); H.C. 4400/92, The Local Authority
Kiryat Arba-Hebron v. Prime Minister, 48(5) P.D. 597 (petition against the policy of the
government to limit the establishment and development of settlements).
161. See H.C. 4877/93, The Organization of Victims of International Arab Terrorism (NETA)
v. State of Israel (not published).
162. A number of petitions were submitted on this matter. See, e.g., H.C. 5218/95, Hanegbi v.
Prime Minister (not published); H.C. 5205/96, Indor v. State of Israel (not published).
163. See, e.g., H.C. 501/80, Zoabi v. Abu Rabia, 35(2) P.D. 262; H.C. 1601/90, Shalit v. Peres,
44(3) P.D. 353; H.C. 1523/90, Levy v. Prime Minister, 44(2) P.D. 213; H.C. 1635/90, Zaijevski v.
Prime Minister, 45(1) P.D. 749; H.C. 5364/94 Valner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labour Party,
49(1) P.D. 758. For a line of articles relating to political agreements and the Court's intervention
in them, see 26 ISR. L. REv. 407-558 (1992).
164. For a discussion of the issue of judicial review of the proceedings of the Knesset, see Meir
Shamgar, Judicial Review of Knesset Decisions by the High Court of Justice, 28 IsR. L. REv. 43
(1994); David Kretzmer, Judicial Review of Knesset Decisions, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 95
(1988).
165. See, e.g., H.C. 742/84, Kahana v. Chairman of the Knesset, 39(4) P.D. 85; H.C. 73/85,
"Kach" Caucus v. Chairman of the Knesset, 39(3) P.D. 141; H.C. 620/85, Miari v. Chairman of
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however, the Court gave the effect of judgment to compromises reached
by the litigants. 166
In other words, there is an increasing tendency in Israel to perceive
politics as law and to regard political questions as legal questions. Polit-
ical questions, such as "what is useful?", "what is just?", and "what (or
who) has political power?", are transformed and reformulated as: "what
is legal?" or "what will withstand judicial review?"
Many Israeli political questions are directed for legal resolution
from an institutional and a substantive point of view. However, the ritu-
als and modes of adjudication adopted by the Israeli legal system when
dealing with these questions do not always conform to traditional meth-
ods. An extreme example of this can be seen in the activities of the legal
commissions of inquiry, which operate methods and apply substantive
rules which are only partially compatible with those accepted in the
legal arena. Even when political questions are considered in court, how-
ever, they are heard differently than the way in which conventional
"legal" questions are heard.
In the United States, too, the phenomenon of politics-as-law exists,
but it takes a different form than its Israeli counterpart. In the United
States, politics-as-law is expressed in the fact that legal questions are
directed for handling and resolution by the legislative and executive
branches, which frequently make decisions based upon standards and
values which are either wholly or partially political. However, the ritu-
als with which the hearings are heard have a manifestly legal dimension.
The politics-as-trial of President Clinton's impeachment proceedings
was a clear example of this. Determination of policy disguised as inter-
pretation of the law in which the Court does not intervene so long as it is
not obviously unreasonable, is also a good example. 167
B. Explanations for the Politics-as-Law Phenomenon
The explanations for this phenomenon are found largely in the uni-
formity of interests of the legal establishment, the political minority, and
the political majority. This uniformity of interests is generally accompa-
nied by public support.
In Israel, the legal establishment is willing and interested in consid-
ering these questions. Indeed, and as the Bar-On Affair well illustrates,
the Knesset, 41(4) P.D. 169; H.C. 5711/91, Poraz v. Chairman of the Knesset, 46(1) P.D. 299;
H.C. 1843/93, Pinhasi v. The Knesset, 49(1) P.D. 661.
166. See, e.g., H.C. 4804/91, Poraz v. Chairman of the Knesset (not published); H.C. 6181/94,
Livnat v. Prime Minister (not published).
167. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 461-90 (1993); STEPHEN
G. BREYER, ET. AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 250-345 (4th ed. 1998).
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the number of cases in which the courts actually annul or change polit-
ical decisions is very low. However, these cases, which by their nature
attract enormous media coverage, are sufficient to create the perception
that the legal establishment is conducting Israeli politics. This percep-
tion, even if it rests on shaky ground, prevails among the general public,
politicians, and many academic scholars. Yet, even if the number of
cases in which the Israeli Courts have cancelled or changed political
decisions is negligible, the near complete removal of obstacles to locus
standi and justiciability and the development of the doctrine of the all-
embracing nature of the law have led the courts to deliberate on these
decisions and refuse to dismiss outright attempts to make it take a stand
on these matters.
It is possible to explain this willingness of the Israeli legal estab-
lishment to consider political questions which the "vacuum" in this area,
which the Courts have been called to fill.168 This "vacuum" has double
significance. One, which I shall consider in more detail below, is the
channeling of political issues by governmental authorities for determina-
tion by the courts. The other is the absence of mechanisms for political
scrutiny of political decisions so that the essential task of scrutiny is
performed by the legal establishment.
The Israeli system of governance, despite important changes in
recent years, still lacks a real separation between the two central political
branches - the legislature and the executive. As a result, the Knesset is
not capable of properly fulfilling the task of constructive and efficient
scrutiny of the Government. The nature of the regime in Israel is such
that the Government is based on a coalition of parties, which include the
majority of members of the Knesset, who support the Government and
fulfill its wishes on every significant topic and who do not possess the
level of autonomy needed for effective review. The principal members
of the Knesset from the coalition parties sit in the cabinet as the Prime
Minister, the ministers (or the overall majority of them), and deputy
ministers. As a result, one-fourth of the Knesset members and two-fifths
of Knesset members belonging to coalition parties are members of the
executive branch. Ordinary Knesset members, who are regarded as jun-
ior and whose political power is generally smaller than the power of the
members of the Government, aspire to be appointed ministers or deputy
ministers. The approach of Knesset members belonging to the opposi-
tion parties is not purely substantive either, instead it aims to undermine
the Government in almost every matter. They, too, are unlikely to
engage in trustworthy and pertinent scrutiny. Moreover, a significant
portion of the activities of the Knesset are devoted to political struggles
168. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 28-35.
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for survival or downfall, and the substantive problems of the country are
often neglected or used as instruments in these struggles.
In this situation, the legal establishment is often the last resort,
without which there would be no appropriate scrutiny at all. As a result,
the legal establishment made itself available for an important national
task.
In the United States, in contrast, there is no governmental vacuum
that the courts are required to fill. In the American regime of the separa-
tion of powers, the federal and state legislative branches are not attached
to the executive branches. Their members enjoy independence whether
or not they are affiliated with a particular party that has been elected to
represent the executive authority. There is less fear than in Israel that
the executive branch will be able to exercise great power without effec-
tive review without routine judicial supervision.
Moreover, the United States still bears the scars of the threat to the
independence of the judiciary following the far-reaching judicial review
in the Lochner case. 169 The courts must preserve their power for cir-
cumstances in which judicial intervention is required, and they must
exercise care that their review is not trivialized.
In addition, one may consider the significant entrenchment in
American culture of ideas that have originated in legal realism and, to a
certain extent, in critical legal studies. In this context, I am referring to
structures that were developed doing these movements, even if not to
their political agenda. It is, possibly the increasing recognition, both
among judges and among the public at large, regarding the political sub-
stance of judicial activity itself and the fact that the courts are political
bodies that contributes to the restraint exercised by the judges (the posi-
tion of many of whom is not dependent on achieving a majority among
the public) in applying their powers.
Against this background, it is possible to understand the differences
between the approaches of the Courts in the two countries towards judi-
cial review of decisions regarding indictments. In Israel, these decisions
are reached by professionals who enjoy an apolitical ethos. It is easier
for the courts to review decisions of such officials, who are counted
among their peers, than to intervene in decisions of political bodies,
some of whom have been elected and have been entrusted with bringing
indictments in the United States.
From the political minority perspective in Israel, applying to the
courts has become a routine and sometimes the only device for achiev-
ing objectives and overcoming the power of the political majority.
169. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Thus, each year, tens of petitions are submitted to the Supreme Court by
Knesset members from the opposition parties. These petitions deal with
both the internal regulation of the work of the Knesset and with public
and political issues on the country's agenda. The Bar-On Affair is an
example of this, as the majority of petitioners during that controversy
were Knesset members belonging to the opposition. An important yard-
stick for the success of a Knesset member belonging to the opposition is
the number of petitions filed by her before the Court, and, of course, the
number of times judgment is given in her favor. This enables Knesset
members from the opposition to overcome their weakness in being part
of the minority. It also allows them to enforce their wishes by means of
the judgment on the majority.
In the United States, petitions also are submitted occasionally by
members of Congress against actions of the executive branch that alleg-
edly injure the legislative branch. However, the extent of the phenome-
non in the United States does not match that in Israel. In the United
States, these petitions are perceived as likely to violate the concept of
separation of powers, and, in many cases, they are received by the Court
with a marked lack of enthusiasm. 170 Different parties often control the
legislative body and the executive authority. In any case, parties form-
ing a minority in a particular branch, but controlling another, have the
political tools to contend with discrimination against them by the branch
in which they form a minority or in which they are not represented and
thus, do not require judicial relief.
From the perspective of the Israeli political majority, which con-
trols the Government and the Knesset, the legalization of politics has
significant advantages, notwithstanding the price, namely, the occasional
negation by the Court of the will of the majority. As already mentioned,
this price is quite low. In practice, annulment of political decisions by
the Court, and, in particular, reliance on the controversial ground of
unreasonableness, are fairly rare.
The phenomenon of politics-as-law in Israel has two primary
advantages from the point of view of the Government and the coalition
in the Knesset that supports it. First, it enables difficult political
problems, which the political authorities cannot or do not wish to
resolve, to be channeled into legal and judicial paths, among these legal
commissions of inquiry. Secondly, the legal standards generally confer
particularly wide discretion upon the political authorities. From a legal
perspective, only in exceptional and extreme cases will a political deci-
sion be declared unreasonable or improper. This is illustrated by the
170. See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241
(1981).
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judgments following the Bar-On Affair. In view of this, the legalization
of politics confers an image of propriety and reasonableness in a high
percentage of decisions made by the governing authorities. This image
is given by the legal establishment, which is headed by the Supreme
Court. This is a branch that enjoys wide public esteem and is perceived
as being trustworthy and objective. 17 It would be extremely difficult
for the political branches to achieve such an image for their decisions
from other sources.
Furthermore, to a large extent, judicial review defeats the claims of
the opposition. This is especially true if it was the opposition that initi-
ated it. It is difficult for a political figure who applied to the Court
against a Government decision and whose petition was denied to obtain
public support for the argument that her petition was denied for purely
"legal" reasons and that the Government decision was in fact substan-
tively wrongful. As clarified in the discussion on the Bar-On Affair, the
figures against whom legal measures were adopted (the Prime Minister
and the Minister of Justice) were successful in exploiting the advantage
resulting from the channeling of the affair into legal proceedings. They
presented the fact that from a legal perspective there was no place to
impose sanctions that would be justified by their conduct.
To an extent, it would seem that politics-as-law in its American
version also contributes to the legitimization of the decisions reached by
political authorities. The very existence of legal rituals has the effect of
softening the image of their decisions even if not necessarily their
content.
Public support in Israel for the legitimization of politics largely
relies on the image of apolitical objectivity enjoyed by the legal estab-
lishment. A legal establishment that is perceived by the public as polit-
ical, or at least as not detached from politics or politicians, would not
necessarily attract the same support and confidence that encourages it to
regulate political questions as would a legal establishment which is seen
as politically unbiased or impartial. One possible explanation for the
difference in this context between the United States and Israel may be
the apolitical image of the legal establishment in Israel. This contrasts
with the more politically oriented image, of the legal establishment in
the United States.
C. Drawbacks of the Politics-as-Law Phenomenon
Despite the publicly-supported uniformity of interests that exists
171. Many studies show that the judiciary in Israel enjoys more public confidence than any
other authority. See, e.g., GAD BARZILAI, EPHRAIM YAAR, & ZEEV SEGAL, THE ISRAELI SUPREME
COURT AND THE ISRAELI PUBLIC (1994).
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between the legal establishment (the political minority and the political
majority) in Israel and the United States the politics-as-law phenomenon
has many drawbacks.
First, politics-as-law often focuses attention on marginal issues.
Thus, in its Israeli version, the phenomenon may lead to public debate
on questions that are essentially as political as if they were purely legal
questions. In contrast, in its American version, legal questions may be
determined on the basis of purely political considerations and strength.
This may result in "question begging". Former Israeli Chief Justice
Meir Shamgar referred to this difficulty when discussing what he
regarded as the pointlessness of the Court's attempt to apply the legal
standard of reasonableness to certain actions of the Government. In this
connection, the Chief Justice wrote:
There are circumstances where the adjudication of a particular case
on the basis of legal standard will miss the point, for the purely legal
solution may obscure the true inherent nature of the problem being
adjudicated. Not infrequently, it is not the legal rules that cause the
problem to arise, and a purely legal determination will have no deci-
sive significance as to the political decision being reviewed itself.
Yet, when the judicial decision has been rendered, and it has been
determined, after passing through the process of judicial review, that
the political decision at issue had, in fact, been taken by one author-
ized to take it, in good faith and in a non-discriminatory manner, and
that the decision was within the zone of reasonableness, the conclu-
sion may form that everything is fine - when the substance of the
political decision itself may be far from that. Does consideration of
the decision to manufacture an airplane or questions related to foreign
affairs reach its end point when it successfully answers the legal crite-
ria? The answer is no. Yet, that could be the mistaken conclusion
that could arise from judicial review of an issue.... Although...
legal standards can [always] be applied, these standards cannot be
seen, in many areas, as answering the ultimate issue.172
There are many reasons why the law and, from the institutional
point of view, the Court, is prevented from regulating certain issues in
such a manner as to embrace their principal substantive elements. One
reason is the binary nature of the judicial process, which is usually based
on a determination or balance between two conflicting principles.'73
Another reason is that, occasionally, the fundamental elements of the
law and its rules are not relevant to the issue with regard to which the
Court is asked to take a legal stand, such as when the issue is profes-
172. H.C. 910/86, Ressler, 42(2) P.D., at 520.
173. See Menachem Moutner, The Reasonableness of Politics, 5 THEORY & CRITICISM 25, 46
(1994) (Hebrew).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sional or technical. 174
Second, legal rules frequently are required to be minimalistic, par-
ticularly when they touch upon the establishment of prohibitions, the
imposition of sanctions for their breach, and the regulation of the opera-
tion of the powers of governmental or administrative authorities. Over-
regulation, particularly where penalties exists for a breach of the law, is
likely to impair freedom and create an atmosphere in society which is
unpleasant and constricted. 75  It also may make the governmental
activities more difficult and complex. This was the main reason given
by the Israeli Supreme Court in the Bar-On Affair regarding the determi-
nation that Minister of Justice Hanegbi would not be indicted for his
conduct in the affair, nor would he be removed from Government office,
even if his conduct contained a deviation from accepted norms of behav-
ior. In other words, there is no overlap between legal rules including the
criteria for judicial review and norms of proper behavior from a moral,
administrative, or professional point of view. Legalization of politics
may legitimize, and even encourage, improper norms of behavior within
the political arena, even if there is no justification for imposing a legal
prohibition of them.
Third, bound up with politics-as-law in its Israeli version is the
intensive involvement of the legal establishment in controversial polit-
ical matters. This involvement is likely to impair the status of the law
and the legal establishment, their prestige, the public confidence in them
as objective and apolitical entities, and, ultimately, the willingness of
governmental bodies and the general public to abide by their judgments.
Politicians often praise the Court when judgment is in their favor. How-
ever, they do not hesitate to condemn the Court with harsh and offensive
language on the few occasions when it disappoints them.
In recent years, Israel has witnessed attacks on the legal establish-
ment in which religious leaders, senior politicians, chairmen of the Bar
Association, media figures, and even senior members of academia 76
have participated. The attack is based on the contention (which, as
noted, is not founded in practice) that the Court is attempting to become,
and perhaps has already become, the "General Manager" of the country
174. See id.
175. See Itzhak Zamir, Ethics in Politics, 17 MISHPATIM (HEB. U.L. REv.) 250, 255 (1987).
176. For a particularly sharp academic criticism, see Ronen Shamir, The Politics of
Reasonableness: Discretion as Judicial Power, 5 THEORY & CRrrICISM 7 (1994). The author
claims that the development of judicial review on grounds of unreasonableness is based on the rise
in power of the professional and managerial class, of which the judges see themselves as part, and
which "take the liberty of scrutinizing the acts of the governing authorities, by virtue of
acknowledging theirs [sic] own superior wisdom." Id. at 18-19. For similar comments, see also
Andrei Marmor, Judicial Review in Israel, 4 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (HAIFA U.L. & GvT. REv.) 133
(1997) (Hebrew).
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by concentrating all the power into the hands of several judges. These
judges are not elected by the public and are not representative of it.
In the United States, such criticism is not unusual. To a large
extent it is the basis of the American Critical Legal Studies move-
ment.177 One should not negate the legitimacy of such a contention, nor
should it be regarded as dangerous. There are two reasons for this.
First, extreme criticism of this type is not routinely heard in the United
States from governmental figures, who have the legal power to harm the
judiciary. Second, substantive changes of the judiciary's authorities
require amending the Constitution. This would be a difficult task that
would necessitate broad national consensus.
It is not certain that in Israel an all-embracing criticism of the legal
establishment does not also present a danger. Israel is a young democ-
racy, and it is doubtful whether all of its authorities and the general
public have completely internalized the game rules of democracy.
Moreover, its constitutional law still has not achieved the stability and
solidity of American constitutional law. Many judges in Israel have
indeed referred to the fear of injury to the prestige of the judiciary as
grounds for restraint by the Court in dealing with political matters in a
way that is likely to be perceived as taking a political stand.1 78 On its
face the American version of politics-as-law is very different. To a large
extent it is even contrary to the Israeli version. Thus, whereas in Israel it
is a common phenomenon to deal with political questions by using sub-
stantive and institutional, legal tools in the United States, politics-as-law
is expressed by legal questions being dealt with by the political
branches. Even if they deal with legal questions by establishing legal
and judicial rituals, in practice these branches weigh considerations
which, either openly or under some guise, are largely the political con-
siderations natural to them.
Notwithstanding this, some of the disadvantages of American poli-
tics-as-law are similar to Israeli politics-as-law. Thus, American poli-
tics-as-law also may lead to question-begging. The discussions held in
177. The Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS) is characterized with un-empathic -
sometimes even hostile - critique, which concerns the legal system as a whole, if not the legal
phenomenon itself. This hostility makes the translation of the CLS critique into relevant
suggestions for conceptual changes or reforms of existing legal doctrines or conceptions very
difficult. CLS are based upon the perception that law is politics. The Crits propose to expose the
political essence of the law, and the ways in which the law camouflage its true essence and
pretends to be politically neutral. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE To CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987).
178. See, e.g., H.C. 396/79, Duikat v. Government of Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1 (D.C.J. Landau);
H.C. 910/86, Ressler, 42(2) P.D. 441 (J. Barak); H.C. 1635/90, Zarjevski, 45(1) P.D. 749 (D.C.J.
Elon); H.C. 4481/91, Bargil, 47(4) P.D. 210 (J. Goldberg).
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the United States Senate on the question of whether to permit the sum-
moning of witnesses on behalf of the prosecution (representatives of the
judicial committee of the House of Representatives) in the impeachment
proceedings conducted against President Clinton are a good example of
such question-begging. Despite the trial ritual and the arguments of the
parties, which referred to the question of the relevancy of the witnesses
concerned in the process, it was clear that the considerations weighed
were primarily political the division of forces in the votes held in the
matter was evidence of this point is clarity.
Indeed, this was not harmful in this specific case because there
were no significant disputes regarding the facts. The situation could
have been different had the Senate been required to decide factual
issues. The substantive question that was to be determined by the Sen-
ate, namely, whether on the basis of these facts it was appropriate to
remove the President, was a political public question, which the Senate
properly could consider. Yet, the fact that the Senate held this hearing
under the guise of a criminal trial was a form of question-begging that,
in certain circumstances, could have inappropriately swung the results of
the hearing.
Even shifting the decision-making power in relation to interpretive
legal questions from the judiciary to the executive branch, as emerges
from the Chevron'7 9 ruling, involves the possibility of question-begging
and, potentially, the weighing of irrelevant considerations. Thus, the
fundamental interest of an executive political branch is not giving
authentic interpretations to political rules, but rather the implementation
of its policy. It is doubtful whether the ritual of legal interpretation can
be a replacement for formal change or clarification of the legal rules
under discussion by the political authority competent to do so.
Although underlying American politics-as-law is the shift of the
decision-making power with respect to certain legal questions with polit-
ical aspects from the judiciary to the legislative and the executive
branches in order to protect the neutral status of the courts, this shift also
may cause harm to the public image of the law and the judiciary from at
least two vantage points. First, the use of legal and judicial ceremonial
procedures for political purposes may harm the far-from-politics image
of the judiciary. The public may find it difficult to distinguish between a
"trial" that is conducted by the Senate and a real trial. Public confidence
in the legal and judicial system may thus be damaged. Secondly, the
public may find it difficult to distinguish between the Court refraining
on the basis of the political question doctrine from hearing a legal ques-
tion by reason of its political ramifications leaving it to be determined
179. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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by other authorities and substantively adopting the position of those
authorities. The Court is likely, therefore, to be regarded as bearing
responsibility for certain policies without having examined them on their
merits.
VIII. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A RIGHT BALANCE
It appears that on one hand, politics-as-law, both in Israel and in the
United States, is an inescapable phenomenon that it has substantive jus-
tification. On the other hand, it has serious drawbacks. These conflict-
ing elements need to be balanced.
On occasion, this balance is carried out by rules that are determined
by elected political branches. The balance effected by these branches is
a declarative political act that is made in the natural course of political
considerations. Yet, the balance often is carried out by the legal estab-
lishment headed by the Court. The Court has the power to interpret the
boundaries of competence of the political authorities. Thus, for exam-
ple, in the United States, the political question doctrine is a judicial crea-
tion, as is the interpretation, linked to this doctrine, which rejects
judicial review of Congressional decisions in impeachment proceedings.
The creation of this balance by the Court is the central expression
of the politics of law. In other words, the Court does not only examine
what solution is provided by existing law to questions brought before it
that are within the political arena. It does not merely content itself, in
addition to examining the existing law, with attempts to define proper
political behavior and explore the possibilities of overturning it (by
means of interpretation, the filling of lacunae, and other means of judi-
cial development of the law) into part of the existing law. Rather, the
Court, like the political branches and politicians, examines the questions
of whether it is desirable to make the proper political behavior obliga-
tory from a legal point of view and whether it is desirable that that
should be done. In this context it considers the societal and public reper-
cussions of its stance, including the impact on its own prestige.
The Israeli Bar-On Affair and the legal deliberations that were an
integral part of it presented a line of examples of the shift from law-as-
politics to the politics of law in the above sense. Many of the examples
have been referred to in this article. Summarized below are merely
some of them.
First, supervision of the police investigation into the affairs of
senior political figures and decisions whether or not to indict them were
made personally by the Attorney General. Secondly, it is doubtful
whether the Prime Minister was subjected to the same law in terms of
the standard of evidence required to indict as that generally applied.
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Third, if indeed the usual law was not applied to the Prime Minister, and
it has been argued that this is not necessarily an improper approach, the
Attorney General denied the same. Fourth, improper actions of the Min-
ister of Justice that deviated from the proper norms of behavior were
found to be neither criminal offenses nor actions that legally required the
imposition of political sanctions. Fifth, it was held that the Attorney
General possessed wider than usual discretion and that the judicial
review of his decisions was more restricted than usual. In practice,
however, it is doubtful whether this was the case. Sixth, in all of the
questions raised before it, the Court exercised judicial review. It did not
set obstacles of locus standi or justiciability. In practice it showed very
limited willingness to intervene in the type of decisions being reviewed.
This policy has a deterrent effect on the authorities, who are aware that
they may be required to justify their decisions to the Court and to the
public. At the same time, it prevents an overly onerous impact on the
substantive freedom of action of the authorities and limits potential harm
to the prestige of the judiciary, which would have occurred had the judi-
ciary routinely intervened in the decisions of the elected political author-
ities, and changed or canceled those decisions. Seventh, the Attorney
General and the State Attorney held that there was no room for legal
proceedings against the majority of those involved in the affair. At the
same time, they condemned some of their actions and portrayed a grave
picture before the public. Yet, ultimately, the impression was that most
of the public was satisfied with the legal conclusions and little value was
accorded to the harsh comments preceeding them.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present a general theory of
the right way of drawing a political balance. Instead I propose two
guidelines.
The first guideline, which I have illustrated throughout the article,
is that the balance should be drawn while taking into consideration the
conditions prevailing in the State and society in question. Inter alia, one
should take into account the character of the regime, the extent of the
political links of the legal establishment, and the nature of the societal,
political and legal culture. Accordingly, the question whether the Amer-
ican approach is or is not preferable to the Israeli approach has little
significance. The relevant circumstances in each of the societies are dif-
ferent. It is possible only to attempt to express an opinion whether the
approach adopted in a particular country is a proper approach, bearing in
mind all of the circumstances prevailing in that country.
The second suggested guideline, which to a certain extent qualifies
the first one as it attempts to be universal in character, is that the politics
of law, in the above context, has limitations. The legal establishment
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must be faithful to the legal rules that are binding on it. The legal rules
stand above politics - not only above the politics of the legislative and
the executive branches, but also above the politics of the judiciary.
